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Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory
Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty,
and the Separation of Powers
VICTORIA NOURSE*
Every lawyer’s theory of statutory interpretation carries with it an idea of
Congress, and every idea of Congress, in turn, carries with it an idea of the
separation of powers. In this Article, I critique three dominant academic
theories of statutory interpretation—textualism, purposivism, and game theory—
for their assumptions about Congress and the separation of powers. I argue that
each academic theory fails to account for Congress’s dominant institutional
features: “the electoral connection,” the “supermajoritarian difficulty,” and the
“principle of structure-induced ambiguity.” This critique yields surprising conclusions, rejecting both standard liberal and conservative views on statutory
interpretation.
“Plain” meaning, it turns out, is not so plain: it is just as capable of
expanding the domain of statutes as is its primary competitor, purposivism,
because it waffles between ordinary and legalist versions of plain meaning.
Conversely, standard views of purposivism, which textualists rightly criticize,
might narrow the scope of statutes if focused on prototypical meaning. Game
theory is far more sophisticated and more realistic about Congress than either
textualism or purposivism and, yet, it too misunderstands Congress. Legislators
bargain not only horizontally but also vertically (with a public audience in
mind). Without considering the vertical audience, game theory may radically
misconstrue a legislative bargain. More importantly, assuming that there is a
deal, when there is none, may import the filibuster rule into the courtroom.
Surely, a faithful agent is not supposed to defer to those who lost the congressional debate and tried to prevent a debate in the first place.
If academic theories assume much about Congress, they also assume much
about the separation of powers, typically in the form of inchoate ideas of
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judicial or legislative power. This Article argues that, in its original Madisonian
form, the separation of powers was idealized not as a set of functional domains,
but as an allocation of electoral forces driven by public representation. If that is
correct, statutory interpretation must hew to textualism’s original aim to embrace ordinary, public meaning and reject academic textualists’ automatic
resort to elite, legalist meaning. At the same time, textualists should, as a
constitutional matter, embrace rather than reject legislative history. For academics, this will seem oxymoronic: scholars define textualism as a rejection of
legislative history. The oxymoron for academics is, however, the widespread
practice of judges who do in fact resort to legislative history in cases of
ambiguity. Implicitly, at least, the judiciary recognizes the constitutional argument for legislative history: that it checks judicial activism by forcing the
judiciary to look to public, legislative meanings, rather than elite legalist
meaning. Call this a “public meaning” theory of statutory interpretation based
on a representational theory of the separation of powers.
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OF SEPARATION OF POWERS RISKS

INTRODUCTION
“Every issue of law resolved by a federal judge involves interpretation of text—
the text of a regulation, or of a statute, or of the Constitution.”
—Justice Antonin Scalia1

When it comes to Congress, contemporary theories of statutory interpretation
risk irony, if not contradiction. Consider textualism, the theory that judges
should stop at plain meaning, blinding themselves to legislative history. One
leading academic textualist describes Congress as “arbitrary” and “strategic,” its
processes “tortuous” and “opaque.”2 If Congress is all that, why should plain

1. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13 (1997).
2. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 431–32 (2005).
“Academic textualism” refers to some textualists’ preference for “expert” or “legalist” meaning.
“Ordinary meaning textualism,” by contrast, prefers “ordinary” or “public” meaning. For a discussion
of this distinction, see infra section I.B. As Judge Posner has explained in detail, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 204–29 (2008), judges are not law professors and are rarely influenced by
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meaning ever arise? Textualists’ academic opponents, purposivists, reverse the
irony. They idealize Congress. As Harvard Professors Hart and Sacks famously
put it, members of the legislature are “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable
purposes reasonably.”3 But if Congress reasons so well, every statute should be
plainly reasonable, not ambiguous enough to send the purposivist running to
legislative history. Game theorists fare better, imagining Congress’s process as a
series of political deals, but this contract model still raises significant questions:
if the bargaining is so efficient and refined, why is it so difficult to pass
legislation, and why are the bargains so difficult to discover?
Taken to extremes, academic theories of statutory interpretation adopt ideas
of Congress capable of contradicting the theories themselves. If we take the
textualists’ view of Congress-as-chaos to its extreme, textualism risks irrelevance—a truly chaotic Congress could not create plain meaning in statutory
text. If we take the purposivists’ view of Congress to its logical extreme, purposivism also risks irrelevance—a truly reasonable Congress will make statutory meaning plain. If we take the game theorists’ view of Congress to its
logical extreme, bargaining would be efficient and interpretation unnecessary. In
my view, having spent a number of years as a legislative staffer, academic
theorists have no coherent idea of Congress, nor one based on what experts
know about how Congress works.4
This should be more than troubling given that every case of statutory
interpretation is in fact an “interbranch encounter.”5 Theories of statutory
interpretation not only imply descriptive theories of Congress, but also normative theories about how Congress should relate to courts or agencies. In short,
theories of statutory interpretation assume, often without any justification or
articulation, theories of the separation of powers. For example, textualists,
purposivists, and game theorists all agree that courts should not exercise
legislative power.6 As students of the separation of powers know, the idea of
legislative power is controversial, and alone is not a theory of the separation of
academic criticism. My audience here is other law professors. This is why the term academic textualism
refers to those in the academy who have urged this position, even if they themselves have relied upon
individual judges for their claims. For the definition of legalist, as equated with conceptual and logical,
see id. at 41 (describing the ideal legalist decision as one grounded in syllogism). For my fuller
distinction between legalist and prototypical meaning, see infra Part II.
3. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., The Foundation Press 1994)
(1958).
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 14 (1994) (“Traditional
legal writers have no theory of legislatures in general . . . .”).
5. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593 (1995).
6. Even those who have critiqued simplistic views of legislative supremacy recognize that it is a
widely held principle, even “intellectual boilerplate.” See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 319 (1989) (interrogating the notion of legislative supremacy). In my view, legislative supremacy requires a normative theory of how the branches should
relate to each other and that, in turn, requires a constitutional theory of the separation of powers. See
infra Part III.
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powers. Yet questions in statutory interpretation about the proper relationship of
courts to Congress and agencies have never been theorized as questions of the
separation of powers.7
It is time to take a serious look at statutory-interpretation theorists’ views of
Congress and how these ideas stack up against the separation of powers. This
Article grounds statutory interpretation in a realistic idea of Congress and an
articulate theory of constitutional structure. Part I begins with Congress, identifying three basic institutional features: the “electoral connection,” the “supermajoritarian difficulty,” and the principle of “structure-induced ambiguity.” Part II
describes and critiques assumptions about Congress implicit within three prominent academic theories of statutory interpretation: textualist, purposivist, and
game theoretic approaches.8 It argues that each theory fails to account for the
institutional features identified in Part I and is as critical of purposivism as it is
of textualism, and even of game theory, on these scores. This analysis reverses
conventional wisdom by suggesting that some forms of academic textualism
have the power to expand statutes’ domains and that a reconceived purposivism
may narrow them. Game theory is in many ways an improvement over standard
approaches, but like its cousins, if it does not fully understand Congress’s
vertical partners (the people), it may bring the filibuster rule into the courtroom,
substituting superminority positions for majority ones.
Part III moves from Congress to the Constitution and the separation of
powers. This Part argues that academic theories of statutory interpretation

7. To be sure, there is wide recognition that constitutional theory should play some role. In the
mid-1990s, the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause was invoked to argue that legislative history was
not “law” but has recently been reinvented as a reason to assume that statutes are finely wrought
compromises reflecting bicameral structure. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1306 (2010) [hereinafter Manning, Second-Generation] (“[E]mphasis on bicameralism and presentment, at a minimum, puts the theory of textualism on firmer [constitutional] ground.”).
At the turn of the new century, scholars debated the scope of “judicial power,” with no apparent
resolution of the tensions between originalist Blackstonian interpretation and modern versions of
anti-originalist textualism. Compare William N. Eskridge Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of
the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001), with
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 & n.64 (2001)
[hereinafter Manning, Equity]. No scholar of the separation of powers would recognize either claim—
based on bicameralism or judicial power alone—as a full theory of the separation of powers, see infra
note 232 (citing a variety of separation of powers theories), as fully consistent with Supreme Court
precedent, see infra Part III, or, in my view, as seeking to implement the Madisonian ideal of the
separation of powers, Victoria Nourse, Toward a “Due Foundation” for the Separation of Powers: The
Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447 (1996).
8. Aficionados of statutory interpretation might argue that I ignore important and in some cases brilliantly
devised academic theories, like Einer Elhauge’s preference-eliciting default rules, EINER ELHAUGE,
STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION (2008), Adrian Vermeule’s welfarist
approach, ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006), or Bill Eskridge’s dynamic interpretation theory, ESKRIDGE, supra note 4. In my opinion,
each of these approaches is a meta-theory of statutory interpretation rather than a theory of interpretation itself. Given the limits of space, and with no disrespect to any of these approaches, I focus most of
this Article on academic approaches with judicial analogues: textualism, purposivism, and deal reconstruction (or at least the academic versions of these theories).
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assume vague ideas about the meaning of judicial and legislative power. Textualism tends toward a “unitary” theory of the separation of powers, purposivism
implements a “shared power” theory, and game theory adopts an eclectic mix of
both. Rejecting these views, this Part argues that the separation of powers is not
about unitary functions but about shifts in representation. Shifting lawmaking
power from the legislature to courts creates three significant representational
risks: risks of super-countermajoritarianism (that the court will embrace the
meanings of a superminority rather than a majority), risks of federalism (that
federal courts, which are far more nationally oriented than Congress, will apply
their own views rather than those more likely to accord with those of states and
localities), and risks of self-referential legalism (preferring judicial to ordinary
meaning). From a constitutional perspective, the least risk to representation and
the separation of powers comes from the unusual marriage of ordinary meaning
textualism with legislative history. This will surprise academics because textualism in the academy defines itself in opposition to legislative history,9 but it is
consistent with what most judges do on a regular basis. More importantly, this
approach is likely to reduce judicial activism, checking the tendency of a judge
to impose his or her preferred policy position rather than that of the people’s
representatives.
If an interpreter is to be a faithful agent of his superior, and representatives
are the people’s agents, then ordinary, popular meaning is to be preferred unless
it is clear that specialized, legalist meaning should apply. A faithful agent
considers every source of information about the legislature’s ordinary meaning,
as game theorists rightly insist. This means that legislative history should be
consulted not to find the intent of the legislature, but as a reference guide and a
lexicon for prototypical legislative meaning. For example, instead of asking
what rule the people’s representatives would imagine in the application of an
employment statute to a particular case (which is typically impossible to find
because the precise situation was never contemplated by the legislature), one
would ask what a majority of representatives meant by the term at issue (for
example, “labor”). In a system in which representation drives the separation of
powers, it is the judges’ job to check their own preferred set of meanings against
the text and the legislative record for evidence of popular, prototypical meaning
before they resort to internal legalist resources (canons, common law, and
precedent). Consulting sources outside the interpreters’ internal views is a
“check”—a process of externalized self-discipline by which the interpreters’
ideological predispositions are measured against the best information about
other people’s meanings. If courts have a duty to police the separation of
9. Academic textualists are not defined by their total rejection of purpose, see Manning, SecondGeneration, supra note 7, at 1316–17 (quoting Justice Scalia), but by their rejection of legislative
history—hence the term “academically oxymoronic.” See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 352 (1994) (“[T]he principal implication of
th[e] ordinary reader perspective is to banish virtually all consideration of legislative history from
statutory interpretation.”).
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powers, judges should continue the majority practice of looking at legislative
history, not only because it is a better source of ordinary meaning, but also
because it advances judges’ constitutional duty of absolute impartiality—their
central role in the separation of powers.10
I. CONGRESS IS NOT A COURT
“We think we know how legislators argue; but do we really?”
—Jeremy Waldron11

Scholars of statutory interpretation have a tendency to project their own
values onto Congress and, finding Congress sorely wanting, to treat it with a
good deal of contempt. In part, this reflects general civic illiteracy coupled with
a law-school curriculum that fails to teach lawyers even the most basic rules
governing congressional behavior. Congress is not a court. It is time statutory
interpretation theorists stopped treating Congress as a “junior varsity” judicial
branch. To change this requires understanding three dominant institutional
forces in congressional lawmaking: the “electoral connection,”12 the supermajoritarian difficulty, and structure-induced ambiguity.
A. THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION

Let us begin with a basic fact about the legislature—the electoral connection.
There is nary a political scientist who does not believe that the electoral
connection—whether viewed as a rosy aim to further the public good or a
craven attempt to extract interest-group rents—is Congress’s most distinctive
feature. The “legislature acts as the eyes, ears, and voice of the people.”13 A
representative “lives and dies,” as the great constitutionalist Charles Black
observed, based on “what [the voters] think of him [back home].”14 As the
10. I fully recognize that how one looks at legislative history is important, for the aim is not to pick
and choose one’s friends from the history, but to read the record: (1) as an external check on the
tendency of judges to use internal meanings—legalist as opposed to prototypical, ordinary meaning,
see infra Part III (discussing legislative history as a “check”); (2) as a lexicon of ordinary meaning in
a particular legislative context—not for an intent unlikely to be there (on the particular interpretive
issue), cf. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128–29, 142–43 (1998) (using dictionaries,
surveys of press reports, and the Bible as lexical references to determine meaning); or (3) as setting the
boundaries of permissible interpretation by revealing the parameters of a textual compromise, see infra
section II.C. A fuller explanation of these uses of legislative history awaits a future article; such an
explanation would detract from the present project but is necessary to complete the theory.
11. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 25 (1999).
12. This term was made famous by DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
(1974).
13. See GINA MISIROGLU, THE HANDY POLITICS ANSWER BOOK 331 (2003) (citing JOHN STUART MILL,
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 104 (1861) (“[T]he proper office of a representative
assembly is to watch and control the government: to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a
full exposition and justification of all them which any one considers questionable; to censure them if
found condemnable . . . .”)).
14. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 13, 16–17 (1974).
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political scientist Richard Hall puts it, “[t]he representative from South Dakota
who concentrates legislative time on South Africa, and the senator from South
Carolina who takes little interest in textile tariffs, whatever their positions and
whatever we may think of their actions, are not being ideal [representatives].”15
That “members of Congress care intensely about reelection,”16 is a view
shared by the greats of political science, from Douglas Arnold to David
Mayhew, from Donald Matthews to Morris Fiorina, from Richard Fenno to John
Kingdon, from Barry Weingast and Kenneth Shepsle to John Ferejohn and Matt
McCubbins.17 Those who write within different political-science traditions—
whether part of the behaviorist revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the rational
choice revolution of the 1980s and 1990s, or some entirely different variant—
share this assumption. Even those political scientists who find no correlation
between people’s views on particular issues and representatives’ voting records,18 or who insist that voters have the “haziest awareness” of specific policy
issues,19 or who believe that party or ideology or public interest are significant,
recognize that the electoral connection has an important role to play.20 If
nothing else, members of Congress say that it matters to them. As the renowned
political scientist Douglas Arnold put it, members try to anticipate what their
constituents want—or at least what their potential opponents at election time
think that their constituents want.21
A brief intellectual experiment illustrates how the electoral connection makes
judges and legislators act and speak in ways almost sure to produce regular
misunderstandings. In what follows, I attempt to “light up” (to borrow Jeremy
Waldron’s felicitous phrase) the differences between judges and legislators in

15. RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 3 (1996) (emphasis omitted).
16. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 5 (1990).
17. See, e.g., RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 31 (1978);
MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 6–7 (1977); LEWIS A.
FROMAN, CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES 9 (1963); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING
DECISIONS (2d ed. 1981); KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING (1998);
DONALD MATTHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD (1960); MAYHEW, supra note 12, at 17 (assuming
that congressmen are “single-minded reelection seekers”); Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice
Perspective on Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 249 (1979) (assuming, as rational choice
principle, that congressmen act as self-interested maximizers).
18. Even those who emphasize the relative freedom of representatives from constituency influence
acknowledge that constituencies have “some influence” over policy decisions. See, e.g., ROBERT A.
BERNSTEIN, ELECTIONS, REPRESENTATION, AND CONGRESSIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOR: THE MYTH OF CONSTITUENCY CONTROL 104 (1989). On the failure of this kind of study to account for the intensity of preference
or measure “activity” on issues of central importance to constituents, see HALL, supra note 15, at 58
(“[T]o the extent that a member believes that her district has an interest in an issue that comes before
her, the more involved in the legislative action she is likely to become.”); id. at 4 (“Although there are
variations . . . and although constituents’ interests are not the only (nor always the most important)
determinant of legislative participation, the general finding that they matter holds true across policy
domains . . . , decision-making forums . . . , and the several stages in a sequential legislative process . . . .”).
19. MAYHEW, supra note 12, at 40.
20. HALL, supra note 15, at 60–65.
21. ARNOLD, supra note 16, at 5.
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terms of audience—the better to understand the vertical dynamics of the
legislature. As we will see, the process is complex; statutes are directed to
multiple audiences, including courts and agencies. For parsimony’s sake, let us
first see the point—that, relative to judges, legislators speak openly to a
different, more public audience. Then we can begin to complicate the story.
Imagine a citizen encountering the Justices of the Supreme Court and asking
them to please address important public problems: health-care costs, crime, and
the budget deficit. Now imagine that in the weeks that follow we hear the
following from the Supreme Court: “Our wives, our mothers, and our colleagues are afraid to walk in grocery store parking lots, to jog in public parks, or
to ride home from work late at night in city buses. They are losing a fundamental human right—the right to be free from fear.”22 To anyone mildly conversant
with the Supreme Court, there is something wrong with this picture. This does
not sound like the statement of a Supreme Court Justice—for Supreme Court
Justices are not supposed to respond to citizens’ needs for legislation. The
statement I have provided is from a member of Congress: former Senator, now
Vice President, Joe Biden.
Now shift your imaginative attention to the legislature. Imagine that a
Senator, unprompted by citizen demand or public uprising, were to rise to make
the following statement on the Senate floor:
Buckley did not consider [section] 610’s separate ban on corporate and union
independent expenditures, the prohibition that had also been in the background in CIO, Automobile Workers, and Pipefitters. Had [section] 610 been
challenged in the wake of Buckley, however, it could not have been squared
with the reasoning and analysis of that precedent. The expenditure ban
invalidated in Buckley, [section] 608(e), applied to corporations and unions,
and some of the prevailing plaintiffs in Buckley were corporations. The
Buckley Court did not invoke the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine
to suggest that [section] 608(e)’s expenditure ban would have been constitutional if it had applied only to corporations and not to individuals. Buckley
cited with approval the Automobile Workers dissent, which argued that
[section] 610 was unconstitutional.

If you guessed that this was not a senatorial statement, but a Supreme Court
opinion, you would be correct. It is taken from Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Citizens United v. FEC.23 Notice how relatively coherent and precise the
rhetoric is, and how unlikely it is that citizens or voters could make heads or
tails of these statements. The Justices value precision, detail, and expert meanings. Whereas representatives speak to their constituents, the Justices speak to
their peers in the elite legal community.
For those who remain unconvinced, some solace may be had by recognizing
22. 136 CONG. REC. 14,564 (1990) (statement of Sen. Biden).
23. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 902 (2010) (citations omitted).
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that individual vice may yield collective virtue. As political scientist David
Mayhew explains, relative to other forms of legislature, “the United States
Congress is extraordinarily effective” at “voicing opinions held by significant
numbers of voters back in the constituencies.”24 As Jeremy Waldron has
written, statutes are “essentially—not just accidentally—the product of large
and polyphonous assemblies.”25 Even the most minimal notions of democratic
consent require that the minority has the opportunity to voice its opposition.
Democracy’s legitimacy depends upon this idea.26 To say that the electoral
connection powerfully distinguishes legislatures from courts is not to say that
representation works, is fair, or is undistorted.27 Members may imagine an
electorate that speaks in a distinctly upper- or lower-class accent. Representatives may be far more responsive to concentrated interest groups than to large
latent majorities. They may follow party dictates or pass symbolic legislation. In
the name of the public good, they may reject their constituents’ specific
demands. The relative institutional point remains the same: a representative is
subject to institutional constraints and incentives directly linking his actions to
voters in ways unthinkable for an unelected judge.28
B. THE SUPERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY AND STRUCTURE-INDUCED AMBIGUITY

If I am correct about the electoral connection, then one of the most basic
forces driving legislatures is different from—in fact, antithetical to—the forces
overtly driving courts.29 This helps to explain resilient institutional misunderstandings. Academics tend to assume that, because members of Congress are

24. MAYHEW, supra note 12, at 106.
25. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 10 (1999).
26. There is nothing particularly new about this idea. The cynic Machiavelli warned that the
legislative “tumults that many inconsiderately damn” may yet yield good laws. See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY 16 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Nathan Tarcov trans., The Univ. of Chicago
Press 1996) (1513); see also MILL, supra note 13, at 105 (“Representative assemblies are often taunted
by their enemies with being places of mere talk and bavardage. There has seldom been more misplaced
derision. . . . A place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even
passionately pleaded . . . is in itself, if it answered no other purpose, one of the most important political
institutions that can exist anywhere, and one of the foremost benefits of free government.”); HALL,
supra note 15, at 238 (quoting same).
27. Serious questions have been raised about whether Congress is in fact accountable to its citizens.
See Jane S. Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress?: Technology and Political Accountability,
89 B.U. L. REV. 641, 643–46 (2009); infra Part III.
28. Some might argue that elected state judges are differently situated but, in fact, all judges, elected
or not, are constrained by the structure of their institution in the sense that they are limited by the cases
and controversies brought to them. All judges, elected or not, are passive entities who must await the
problems that come to them on an individualized basis in case-by-case form and are bound by law to
follow precedent. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 267–68 (1994).
29. I recognize that there is a wide political-science literature suggesting that courts are roughly
responsive to democratic concerns. The attitudinal school of thought suggests that there is nothing to
judging other than politics. This is far too simplistic a view, and one I have rejected elsewhere. See
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a
New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (2009) (discussing the attitudinal studies at length).
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lawyers, they do and should speak in the voices of lawyers or judges. To be
sure, members of Congress do not leave their law degrees at the door when they
enter the House or Senate chamber. But the structure of the institution plays an
important role in how the individual speaks and acts. It is not simply that
language alone invites semantic imprecision. The structure of legislative institutions increases the likelihood and value of semantic imprecision.
Take a Senator out of the Senate chamber and ask him to appear before a
court, and he will speak in the language of the expert lawyer. Put him back in
the Senate and ask him to pass a budget resolution or a tax cut, and he will
speak in a different voice. The institution changes the Senator’s audience and,
with it, his incentives. For a legislator, legal ambiguity may be quite rational,
not because he or she individually prefers it, but because the institution we
know as Congress produces conditions demanding it—what I term structureinduced ambiguity.30 If legal ambiguity is the necessary cost of passing a crucial
budget resolution, rational legislators will choose legal ambiguity. From the
stance of a court looking at the budget statute, this may not be virtuous, but
from the position of the legislator or members of the public, who need a budget
more than they need semantic precision, it may be both right and necessary.
The larger the drafting body, the greater the potential for structure-induced
ambiguity: a court made up of 100 members would find it hard to agree upon a
single opinion. But our legislative system exacerbates ambiguity by what I call
the supermajoritarian difficulty. No one who studies Congress thinks it easy to
pass legislation.31 It is far easier to stop than to enact legislation. There are too
many steps in the process (what are frequently called vetogates): legislation
must make it from assignment to a committee, from a subcommittee hearing to
full committee, from the House to the Rules Committee, and from debate on the
rule to debate on the House floor. It must then survive the gauntlet in the Senate,
moving from subcommittee to committee to debate and potential filibuster.
Finally, failure to obtain the capstone requirement—the President’s signature—
may necessitate a veto override.32
The Constitution creates these legislative difficulties by requiring bicameral-

30. The obvious reference here is to “structure-induced equilibrium,” a term made popular by the
political scientists Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast,
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 5,
8 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1995); see also Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional
Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27, 27 (1979)
(offering a model of legislative behavior that results in “equilibrium”).
31. See, e.g., DAVID W. BRADY & CRAIG VOLDEN, REVOLVING GRIDLOCK: POLITICS AND POLICY FROM
JIMMY CARTER TO GEORGE W. BUSH (2d ed. 2006) (study by legislative scholars); William N. Eskridge
Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1447–48 (2008); McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 11 (1994) (“[I]t is difficult and time-consuming to change most prior legislative bargains.”)
(study by positive political theorists). Note that “McNollgast” is a pseudonym collectively adopted by
three authors: Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast.
32. See generally Eskridge, supra note 31.
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ism,33 entrenching equal state representation,34 and allowing Congress to set its
own procedures.35 In such a system, legislation is difficult and gridlock a
permanent state of affairs. This is not only a practical reality, but also a
constitutional inevitability. State representation is constitutionally entrenched in
the Senate. Because of bicameralism, minorities (small states) may always
block legislation. As political scientists like Robert Dahl and Keith Krehbiel
have argued, the structure of our government is far less majoritarian than most
assume.36 As the constitutionalist Sanford Levinson writes, “almost a full
quarter of the Senate is elected by twelve states whose total population,
approximately 14 million, is less than 5 percent of the total U.S. population.”37
The filibuster rule exponentially increases the power of small minorities to
block congressional action. Positive political theorists now agree that since the
1980s the filibuster threat has meant that legislation on even remotely salient
political issues requires a supermajority—one must garner sixty votes on nearly
every bill.38
The supermajoritarian difficulty, when combined with the electoral connection, creates enormous pressure for structure-induced statutory ambiguity. Although there are few electoral costs of ambiguity (no one ever lost an election
because of imprecision), ambiguity may yield essential gains in achieving
supermajority consensus. Failure to appreciate this structure creates enormous
misunderstanding between courts and legislatures. Courts prize interpretive
virtues—“precision in drafting, consciousness of interpretive rules, discovery of
meaning in past precedent, and detached reflection on the language of particular
texts.”39 Legislatures, on the other hand, prize collective and representational
virtues—“action and agreement, reconciling political interests, and addressing
the pragmatic needs of those affected by legislation.”40
Consider the following example. During debates on the Violence Against
Women Act, opponents claimed that the bill would cover every act of violence
between a man and a woman, leading to massive numbers of cases brought to

33.
34.
35.
36.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2001);
KREHBIEL, supra note 17; see also BRADY & VOLDEN, supra note 31.
37. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG
(AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 51 (2006).
38. On the increasing importance of the filibuster threat, see SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH,
POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?: FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 6 (1997) (quoting former Senator
Charles Mathias in 1994 that the filibuster had become “far less visible but far more frequent” and “an
epidemic”); GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE
U.S. SENATE 10 (2006) (“The Senate’s rules that protect unlimited debate . . . effectively require
supermajorities for the passage of legislation . . . .”). The practice of “holds” is what a modern filibuster
looks like; a hold can be put on any legislation by a single Senator.
39. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 615 (2002).
40. Id.
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federal court.41 To assuage opponents, the drafters accepted the argument—
quite literally. They added bill language stating that the remedy did not cover
“random acts of violence.”42 From the sponsors’ perspective, they gave away
nothing because the bill was never intended to cover such acts. Instead, the
amendment was an attempt to defuse a political argument. There is no guarantee, however, that this language would not, in some future case, become the
subject of interpretive controversy (what is a “random” crime, after all?).
This is not an isolated example. Members draft language not only to achieve
particular goals, but also to respond to other members’ political objections
(objections often couched in public or ordinary meaning rather than legalist
meaning). For example, one Senator might argue: “this bill creates a highway
quota,” without defining the term “highway quota.” The other side might then
respond in the statutory language itself by writing the public objection into the
bill: “nothing in this bill should be construed to create highway quotas.”
Meanwhile, no one has bothered to define the term “highway quotas.” Why?
The answer lies in structure—the pressures of getting a bill done, the potential
that any further definition will undermine a fragile coalition, and the need for
the vast consensus (sixty votes) demanded by the supermajoritarian difficulty.
Structure-induced incentives yield what I have dubbed the constitutive legislative virtues. In a qualitative empirical study of legislative drafting, Stanford
Law Professor Jane Schacter and I found that
[o]ver and over again, staffers explained their choices in terms of constitutive virtues—that deliberate ambiguity was necessary to “get the bill passed,”
or that statutory language was drafted on the floor because a bill was
“needed” by a particular senator, by the leadership, or by the public. Even
staffers’ reliance on lobbyists was an attempt to understand how the bill would
“affect” people in the world. It was not that the staffers did not know the rules
or recognize the interpretive virtues; it was that those virtues frequently were
trumped by competing virtues demanded by the institutional context of the
legislature. In an ideal world, the staffers seemed to say, they would aspire to
both clarity and agreement, but, if there were a choice to be made, the
constitutive virtues would prevail.43

It would be comforting if we could insulate statutory text from the electoral
connection: congressmen could speak to voters in grand speeches and to courts
in statutory text. By and large, I believe that members try to be as specific and
lawyerly as possible. But there is no “acoustic separation,” as law professor
41. See FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 309–444 (2009) (discussing this
battle).
42. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), S. 11, 103d Cong. § 302(e)(1) (1993) (excluding “random acts of violence unrelated to gender”); see also Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship,
and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1,
14 n.74 (1996).
43. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 39, at 615.
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Meir Dan-Cohen once put it, between the call of the voter, and the call of the
court.44 We cannot put legislators in a soundproof chamber when they speak to
their constituents and then in another soundproof room when they mark up a
bill. Speaking to the public either directly or through other members may
involve arcane legalisms as easily as vernacular speech. A debate on securities
reform will proceed in lawyerly terms. But it cannot be true that statutes are
written only for courts (as opposed to the people). As Justice Scalia once wisely
proclaimed, it would be horrifying if, like Nero, Congress posted statutes “high
up on the pillars, so that they could not easily be read”—so that the ordinary
man could not know the laws to which he had consented to be governed.45
Statutes, like congressional debates, are exercises in communication between
representatives and citizens (the vertical dimension) as much as between legislatures and other government branches (the horizontal dimension). There would
be no purpose to a statute if it did not communicate rules to people46: “do not
defraud,” “do not file frivolous lawsuits,” “do not kill.” Of course, statutes are
also, to varying degrees, directions to those who would apply the statutes and
thus are communications to legal experts (lawyers,47 agencies,48 and courts). For
these reasons, statutory language is often an amalgam of the prototypical and
the conceptual—ordinary and legalist meanings. In part, this reflects how
humans use language: most linguists agree that human beings use language in
ways that are prototypical, by which they mean the “best example,” and
conceptual, by which they mean “all examples.”49 For my purposes, I define
ordinary meaning in these terms, as searching for the best example, while
legalist meaning seeks a conceptual or logical extension to all examples.
Ordinary meaning is important in statutory interpretation because members talk
to the public, their constituents, at least as much as they act as expert legal
draftsmen. Public constituencies increase members’ incentives to use prototypical meanings (relative to a situation in which they were in an acoustic chamber
talking only to courts). These incentives, whether we like it or not, apply even in

44. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1984).
45. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 17.
46. See AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 97 (Sari Bashi trans., 2005) (“[Statutory
text] is communicative; it is designed to establish a legal norm to which people will conform their
behavior.”).
47. Indeed, as Bill Eskridge has explained, “[m]ost interpretation is done in the lawyer’s office, on
the police officer’s beat, and at the bureaucrat’s desk.” ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 71–72.
48. Ed Rubin is correct that even laws addressed to the citizenry are often implemented through
agencies. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369, 369 (1989). So too, “a large and increasing body of interpretations” is made by agencies. Peter L.
Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility To Read: Agency Interpretation
and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 321 (1990). But this tells us little
about the internal dynamics of Congress (much less agencies). No politician thinks he can maintain his
seat by spending more time at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Federal Trade Commission
than in his home state.
49. See Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2039–44 (2005).
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statutory text.
In part this is because of the electoral connection—when members say “no
highway quotas,” they are speaking to their constituents, to other representatives, or those representatives’ constituents. In part, this is because of the
extraordinary demands upon legislators’ time: Congress addresses every issue
under the sun, not one case at a time, but health care and war and disaster relief
and international relations and nuclear power simultaneously. This is exacerbated by the supermajoritarian difficulty: coalitions can be fragile, and the more
fragile they are, the more likely members will embrace ambiguity to keep a bill
moving because the electoral costs of imprecision are low versus the electoral
gain in passing an important piece of legislation.50 In such a world, ambiguity
may become rational, even virtuous.
Structure-induced ambiguity should be distinguished from other prominent
claims about legislative ambiguity. First, this ambiguity hails not from linguistic
vagueness, the kind one sees in common law cases about contracts and wills,
but from the structure of Congress as an institution. It does not emerge simply
because of what H. L. A. Hart called legislatures’ “inability to anticipate.”51
Even if Congress were clairvoyant, it would still be subject to the electoral
connection and the supermajoritarian difficulty. Second, this ambiguity is not
simply a function of time.52 Dynamic theories of statutory interpretation claim
that ambiguity is inevitable because of history: “[o]ver time, the gaps and
ambiguities proliferate as society changes, adapts to the statute, and generates
new variations on the problem initially targeted by the statute.”53 But structureinduced ambiguity exists on Day Number One, immediately upon statutory
enactment.54 Finally, this ambiguity differs from game theorists’ claims of
“strategic ambiguity”: that members of Congress act to influence how courts
will interpret a statute.55 Representatives do anticipate the actions of other elite
actors; they may try mightily to influence the way in which courts or agencies
interpret statutes.56 But it is also possible, as we will see in more detail later, to
exaggerate the degree to which strategic action, as opposed to congressional
structure, produces ambiguity. Bargaining in legislatures is done horizontally—
anticipating the consequences of actors next in line, like a court or an agency—

50. For a more analytic distinction between prototypical and legalist meaning, see infra text
accompanying notes 116–23.
51. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125 (1961).
52. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 9–10.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
L.J. 523 (1992).
55. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640–43 (2002).
56. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. L.J. 705, 715 (1992).
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and vertically—anticipating how constituents will react.57 Legislators are always
talking to third parties (their constituents) and, unless those third parties are
included in “the game,” it is just as likely, indeed in my view far more likely,
that the electoral connection will produce far more ambiguity than legislators’
self-conscious attempts to manipulate courts.58
C. THE MERITS OF A MINIMALIST, EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH

Academic critics will complain that I have left out a vast range of political
theory about median or pivotal voters, cycling, or agenda setting. This is
intentional for two reasons. First, a good deal of political theory is just that,
theory, and my aim is to rely upon the most basic, tested, and sound evidence
(hence the term “evidence-based” approach) rather than choosing a more or less
controversial theory from another discipline.59 Second, my aim is orthogonal to
that of political theory, which is to predict policy outcomes. My purpose is to
describe the minimum necessary conditions for an evidence-based theory of
legislative process and, through that, statutory interpretation.
As a minimalist theory, my approach builds on uncontroversial evidentiary
premises. What is true of legislative history—it has a tendency to permit
statutory interpreters to look out over the crowd, picking and choosing their
favorite pieces of evidence—is also true of statutory interpretation theory.
Textualists, as Judge Posner writes, have tended to rely upon theories that
treat Congress with contempt—assuming that its decisions can never be rational, the process is highly chaotic, and majorities perpetually “cycle” according
to Arrow’s Theorem.60 Academic textualists who now seek to distance them57. See Tim Groseclose & Nolan McCarty, The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience,
45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 100, 101 (2001) (“Almost all models of bargaining ignore the possibility that the
two primary negotiators want to send signals to a third party.”); see also James D. Fearon, Domestic
Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 577 (1994)
(discussing vertical and horizontal considerations of democratic states conducting foreign policy).
58. Why does the congressman care more about the vertical market (the constituency) than the
horizontal market (the court or agency)? In part the answer is timing. A representative’s electoral fate
depends upon the claim that she has done something; a court may undo that, but the judicial intervention is most likely to be long after the election. For example, the Violence Against Women Act’s
civil rights remedy was passed in 1994 but was not adjudicated unconstitutional until six years—three
House electoral cycles—later. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1796, 1941, invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619
(2000). In part the answer is the power of the vertical market to trump the horizontal market. Even if
the court rules against the representative, that might not yield a bad electoral outcome: it might simply
add to the salience and importance of the position-taking of the representative. More people might vote
for her precisely because the court rejected her position.
59. See GERRY MACKIE, DEMOCRACY DEFENDED 156 (2003) (“The Arrow theorem is a great piece of
work. . . . It is a logical exercise, it does not describe the real world.”). Elsewhere I have called this
evidence-based approach a “new realism.” See generally Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 29.
60. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 195 (suggesting that there is a political valence to the view that
“[s]tudents of public choice, and political conservatives generally, being skeptical about the good faith
of legislators, fearing the excesses of democracy, [and] deeming statutes unprincipled compromises . . . deny that statutes ever have a ‘spirit’ or coherent purposes that might . . . limit judges’
discretion”).
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selves from this view admit that “early textualism’s grounding in public
choice theory seemed to reflect an antipathy to the legislative process or, at
least, had a certain ‘eat your spinach’ quality to it.”61 Meanwhile, academic
purposivists have tended to rely upon political theory suggesting a rosy pluralist
view. Neither portrayal of Congress, as angel or devil, is well supported by the
evidence.
Political theory aims for something different than a theory of statutory
interpretation. It aims to predict policy outcomes and, for that reason, like a
weather forecast, it yields few satisfying predictions. Interest-group theory
yields highly indeterminate results.62 Neither a party-driven model nor a
median-voter model63 explains something as basic as why most bills pass by
large bipartisan majorities64—something supermajoritarianism does explain.65 Indeed, twenty years of theorizing has been devoted to showing that Arrow’s cycling
prediction is theory, not fact. As Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast wrote a
decade ago: “in no sense [is] there evidence that majority cycling [is] a constant
companion of legislative life.”66 The “structure and process of legislative
decisionmaking, once established, leads to policy choices that are structurally
stable.”67
I fully agree that the facts I emphasize—the electoral connection, the supermajoritarian difficulty, and structure-induced ambiguity—will not predict political
outcomes. My purpose is to critique legal academics’ views of Congress using a
minimal set of uncontroversial facts we know about Congress.68 Some political
61. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 7, at 1289.
62. For a devastating critique of interest group theory, see JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 87–96 (1997). See also Jack M. Beermann, Interest
Group Politics and Judicial Behavior: Macey’s Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183 (1991).
63. Party models are associated with the work of E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT (1942),
and conditional party models with that of DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM
HOUSE (1991). Median voter theory is associated with the classic work of DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY
OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958).
64. See KREHBIEL, supra note 17, at 6; see also id. at 9 (“While U.S. parties adopt platforms in national
conventions, their platforms are usually amorphous, frequently identical on many provisions, and hardly ever
serve effectively as constraints during the campaign or after the election.”); id. at 13 (median voter theory
predicts that winning voting coalitions are “usually small . . . near minimum-majority size”).
65. As Krehbiel writes, “[c]onsider . . . all votes on final passage of laws enacted by the 102d and
103d Congresses (1991–94). The average size of the winning coalition on these 324 votes is 79
percent.” Id. at 6; see also DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–2002, at 119–36 (2d ed. 2005) (reporting large coalitions for significant bills).
Even among positive political theorists addressing legislative matters, there is dispute about the
meaning or viability of Arrow’s Theorem. Compare McNollgast, supra note 31, at 20 & n.41 (arguing
that Arrow’s Theorem is too pessimistic about legislatures’ ability to express reasonable preferences),
with Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as an
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241–56 (1992) (defending Arrow’s Theorem).
66. Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 30, at 7; see also Shepsle, supra note 30, at 27 (offering a model
of legislative behavior that results in “equilibrium”).
67. McNollgast, supra note 31, at 20.
68. See KREHBIEL, supra note 17, at 8–16 (arguing that median-voter theory, party-driven and
conditional-party theories, Arrow’s Theorem, and stability-inducing theories do not explain either the
sizes of majority coalitions or gridlock).
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scientists might dispute my emphasis on supermajoritarianism as too Senatefocused,69 but bicameralism demands such a focus, as the best students of the
process and the Constitution, such as John Manning, understand.70
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION THEORIES AND THEIR IDEAS OF CONGRESS
“The legislative process is inertial, legislative capacity limited,
the legislative agenda crowded . . . .”
—Judge Richard Posner71

Measured by features identified in Part I, three of our most prominent
academic theories of statutory interpretation—textualism, purposivism, and
game theory72—misunderstand Congress. Each fails to account for the electoral connection, the supermajoritarian difficulty, and structure-induced
ambiguity.
A. TEXTUALISM

In 1987, Justice Scalia gave an extremely influential set of lectures in which
he set forth a doctrine of statutory interpretation known as the “new textualism.”73 Since the country’s founding, statutory text has always been the starting
place for theories of statutory interpretation, but Justice Scalia’s new textualism
placed text at center stage. As Bill Eskridge explains: “Scalia’s main point is
that a statutory text’s apparent plain meaning must be the alpha and the omega
in a judge’s interpretation of the statute.”74 Although traditional practice typically allowed judges to consider multiple factors, including legislative history
and the statute’s purposes, textualists narrowed the range of permissible evidence in statutory matters to the text. “Legislative history should not even be
consulted to confirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text.”75 If a law is
within the text, “end of case”; the judge should go no further.76
Scalia’s theory influenced a generation of legal scholars, including myself.

69. This same claim could be made in reverse about structure-induced equilibria theory—that it has
falsely extrapolated from the study of the House and its committee structures, not to mention its Rules
Committee, which is a powerful agenda-setter absent from the Senate, see generally GARY W. COX &
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (2005). No theory of legislation (as opposed to a theory of the House, Senate, or
politics more generally) is complete without considering both the House and Senate.
70. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 7, at 1306 (emphasizing bicameralism).
71. POSNER, supra note 2, at 201.
72. I have chosen for the sake of brevity to limit myself here to three of the most widely cited
theories of statutory interpretation.
73. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 3–47 (reprinting an essay based on the lecture with commentary).
74. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1511 (1998)
(book review).
75. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990); see also
SCALIA, supra note 1, at 31 (“I object to the use of legislative history on principle, since I reject intent of
the legislature as the proper criterion of the law.”).
76. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 20.
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There are many grounds on which I stand firmly with him. Judges must be
restrained; they must engage in strictly impartial interpretation. I tell my
students: “read the text, read the text, read the text.”77 And I firmly agree that
“ordinary meaning” is theoretically important and even essential given Congress’s structure and incentives. As Jonathan Molot has explained, “we have all
become textualists.”78 This is true even though the theory has not had the kind
of radical effect its academic proponents might have hoped: the Supreme Court
majority and the courts of appeals have rejected a ban on legislative history.79
My concern is not with Justice Scalia’s wonderful essay, but with the vast
literature it has spawned. It has yielded literally thousands of pages and
hundreds of erudite exchanges, many of which stand as the great intellectual
battles of our day. Textualism has garnered sophisticated academic proponents,
such as Harvard’s John Manning and Adrian Vermeule, who moved the theory
in particular directions and gained support in other literatures. Because of its
sophisticated academic proponents, academic textualism is increasingly taught
as the gold standard to law students. Lawyers love rules, and here is a simple
rule: “[W]hen construing statutes, consider the text, the whole text, and nothing
but the text. Period.”80 The academic theory of this seemingly simple rule,
however, is not simple; it is complex and has suggested to some academics
that judges should go so far as to embrace absurd results if the text so
demands.81 And because its academic proponents decline to honor “congressional intent,” it has yielded some determined, yet conservative, judicial opponents: Judge Posner calls its more radical manifestations the “autistic” theory of
statutory interpretation.82

77. Judge Friendly once reported that when Justice Frankfurter was still teaching, he urged his
students to follow a three-pronged rule for statutory interpretation: “(1) Read the statute; (2) read the
statute; (3) read the statute!” HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes,
in BENCHMARKS 196, 202 (1967).
78. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36 (2006).
79. For a compilation of the empirical evidence, see Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 55, at 684.
For more recent studies, see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on
Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117,
128–31 (2008) (surveying use of legislative history in tax and employment cases); Abbe R. Gluck, The
States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified
Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1771–811 (2010) (surveying use of modified textualist interpretive
methodologies among state courts of last resort); Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice
Scalia’s Revolutionary Call To Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. Rev. 121, 123 (2000) (“As
we survey decisions across the country, we observe little that has changed in the way that courts
interpret statutes. In short, the Supreme Court, other federal courts, and state courts throughout the
country continue to use legislative history to interpret statutes.”). But see Merrill, supra note 9, at 364
(finding a rise in textualism in the Supreme Court as compared to the 1980s, but concluding that only
two Justices, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, are committed to the anti-legislative history program).
80. Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1514.
81. See generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003)
(considering this position).
82. POSNER, supra note 2, at 194.
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Let us turn to an example: Church of the Holy Trinity83 figures prominently in
academic textualist theory.84 The question in Holy Trinity was whether a
minister who contracted to serve a New York church fell within a statute aimed
to prevent large scale importation of immigrant laborers. In fact, the case is an
easy target because it makes the textualists’ point at the outset. As the Supreme
Court explained: “It must be conceded that the act of the [church] is within the
letter of this section,” the statute applying not only to “‘labor’ and ‘service’” but
labor and service “of any kind.”85 To top it off, the Court noted that the statute
exempted singers, lecturers, and domestics and thus “strengthen[ed] the idea
that every other kind of labor and service,” came within the law.86 Having noted
these textual arguments for covering the good rector, the Court ignored them,
reading the statute to exclude him, relying on the rule that any plain reading of
the statute was so “broad” as to
reach cases and acts which the whole history and life of the country affirm
could not have been intentionally legislated against. It is the duty of the
courts, under those circumstances, to say that, however broad the language of
the statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not within the
intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.87

Thus, a statute whose “intention” was to prevent mass importation of manual
laborers, not brain-toilers,88 excluded the rector. For textualists, Holy Trinity is
Holy Tragedy—its reference to legislative “spirits” is dead wrong, and the case
should have been decided based on “the letter of the statute.”89 Labor means all
labor, and that is the end of the matter.
1. Textualism’s Janus-Faced Image of Congress
Emerging from textualism’s scholarly elaboration is what I will call a devil/
angel view of Congress, with heavy emphasis on the devil. Academic textualists’ most ardent supporters are resolutely pessimistic (if not contemptuous)
about the legislative process. Here are some of the adjectives one scholar has
used in describing the legislative process: “opaque,” “awkward,” “complex,”
“cumbersome,” “highly intricate,” “strategic,” “arbitrary,” “nonsubstantive,”

83. Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States (Church of the Holy Trinity), 143 U.S. 457
(1892).
84. Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story
of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1845–50 (1998); see also SCALIA, supra note 1, at
18–22; Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory
Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 905–08 (2000); Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1517–19.
85. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 459.
87. Id. at 472.
88. See id. at 463.
89. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 18–22; see also Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1517–19; Vermeule, supra
note 84, at 1845–50.
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and “tortuous”—and this in a single short article.90 In fairness, “secondgeneration textualism” has been kinder to Congress.91 Whether first- or secondgeneration, however, academic textualists still hold out hope that their theory
will discipline Congress to write better statutes.92 Overtly, or perhaps secretly,
textualists dream of Congress as the expert wordsmith, the veritable greeneye-shaded scrivener, but see only a crass, unprincipled deal maker.
If the “devil” view were correct—if congressional action were truly chaotic—
then it is doubtful that what came out of the legislative chamber (the words
of the statute) would be any less “opaque,” “awkward,” “complex,” “cumbersome,” “highly intricate,” “strategic,” “arbitrary,” “nonsubstantive,” and “tortuous” than academic textualism describes.93 The devil view simply goes too far,
and should go too far even for honest textualists. Given their view of Congress,
textualists must take one of two positions: they must either concede that Congress is
plain on some occasions (in which case they will have to explain the variation
between the “chaotic” Congress and the “plain meaning” Congress), or they
have to take the position that the plain meaning is never plain meaning from
Congress, but plain meaning conferred upon the statute by judges who determine what is plain and what is not. As a judicious member of the Federalist
Society, Professor Thomas Merrill has written: “In effect, the textualist interpreter does not find the meaning of the statute so much as construct the
meaning.”94
If Congress cannot provide plain meaning, then it follows that the only body
capable of conferring plain meaning is the court (or perhaps an agency). Here,
however, we have come full circle. Academic textualists fear that, by looking at
legislative history, courts will exert their own will. Textualists’ views of Congress suggest the opposite: by asserting that ambiguous meaning is plain, judges
are exerting their own will.95 Honest textualists must answer the critic, like
Professor Merrill, who says that the “judicial activism” may be in finding
meaning plain when,96 as textualists themselves argue, in “99.99 percent of the

90. Manning, supra note 2, at 431, 438 (“tortuous”); id. at 423, 430 n.34, 431, 444 n.84, 450
(“opaque”); id. at 424, 429 n.30, 430, 438 n.64, 448 n.96, 450 (“complex”); id. at 423, 426 n.23, 431
(“cumbersome”); id. at 432 & n.43 (“strategic”); id. at 431, 432 n.43 (“arbitrary”); id. at 420, 425, 445
(“awkward”); id. at 431, 432 (“nonsubstantive”); id. at 431 (“highly intricate”).
91. See Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 7, at 1315 (“Second-generation textualism seems
to embrace the legislative process, with all its foibles.”).
92. Schacter, supra note 5, at 644–45. For a wisely skeptical view of this claim, see VERMEULE,
supra note 8.
93. See supra note 90.
94. Merrill, supra note 9, at 372.
95. Mikva & Lane, supra note 79, at 137 (“[Justice Scalia] seems to frequently argue despite what
seems to be evident ambiguity that a statute is clear.”).
96. Mikva and Lane argue that there is a political tilt to textualism—that it “is directed at limiting
statutory scope rather than expanding it.” Id. at 123; see also FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 27–57, 163 (2009) (arguing that Judge Easterbrook’s Statutes’
Domains approach, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983), is openly antiregulation because it constricts
statutes’ reach by interpreting them to only cover matters spoken to by the text). In fact, as I argue
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issues of construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent.”97
Some advocates of the devil view of Congress ground their theory in sophisticated, but controversial, and increasingly dated, political science. They argue
that legislative intent is impossible because there can be no stable majoritarian
set of preferences. “Many legal scholars have expressed skepticism on the
grounds that majority rule decision-making is chaotic,” based on the Arrow
Impossibility Theorem, a theory that makes democracy impossible in a seemingly vast range of cases.98 As Professor Manning explains, “[i]nvoking the economic
and game-theoretic insights of public choice theory, textualists thus emphasize that
laws frequently reflect whatever bargain competing interest groups could strike rather
than the fully principled policy judgment of a single-minded majority.”99
For reasons we have already seen,100 not only are second-generation textualists moving away from this view, but the underlying ideas are under much
greater scrutiny by political scientists and lawyers today.101 The theory simply
proves too much: if democracy were never possible, how could one explain the
Civil Rights Acts or tax cuts or Social Security or the Clinton balanced budget?
Without being able to prove variation—an impossibility if democracy never
happens—such theories do not withstand the most basic standards of predictive,
empirical social science. Even if these theories were correct, however, they
would still pose a problem: Where does statutory plain meaning come from, if it
must emerge from such a process? And if statutory plain meaning does not
reflect democracy, then why does it deserve judicial deference?
The textualist will respond that the text is a better alternative than legislative
history. Indeed, the most persuasive point made by textualists is that legislative
history is simply too hard to find, to decipher, and to understand (a point with
which I am sympathetic). Bracketing for the moment this practical claim,
textualists go further. They argue that the text is the only constitutionally based
source of meaning: individual legislators’ statements have not been approved by

below, there is nothing terribly libertarian about textualism as a matter of logical necessity; in Holy
Trinity, for example, the textualist argument expands the regulatory scheme from the baseline prototypical meaning of manual labor.
97. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 32.
98. McNollgast, supra note 31, at 3. On the pervasive and unfortunate influence of cycling theory
within political science, see MACKIE, supra note 59, at 72–157.
99. Manning, supra note 2, at 431 (footnote omitted).
100. See supra section I.C.
101. Even before the economic collapse and his recantation of some portions of law and economics,
one of its founders, Judge Posner, wrote that he believed that the “economic approach to legislation”
was “incomplete” and he disagreed with those who had “pushed it further than [he had].” Richard A.
Posner, Legislation and Its Intepretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431, 434 (1989). More recent work
by positive political theorists has questioned some of the premises of strict application of economic
assumptions to the political world. See, e.g., John Ferejohn, Practical Institutionalism, in RETHINKING
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: THE ART OF THE STATE 72, 73–74 (Shapiro et al. eds., 2006) (rejecting the basic
economic assumption that preferences are exogenous to institutions). Even the work in political science
on structure-induced equilibria shows the power of institutions to “correct” the more extreme predictions of Arrovian Theory. See Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 66, at 22.
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two houses and the President.102 Put bluntly, both text and legislative history may be
chaotic, but text has greater constitutional legitimacy.103 Again, this argument goes too
far: legitimate chaos may be legitimate, but it still is chaos. There is nothing about
bicameralism that selects out text as opposed to votes. Taken to its extreme, the
bicameralism argument would give legitimacy to a list of random zeros and ones, as
long as the list was passed by the Senate and the House and signed by the President.
Put in other words, it would confer legitimacy on absurdity.104
Now let us turn to the angel ideal: academic textualists criticize Congress
hoping to induce legislators to write clearer statutes.105 Visions of an expert
scrivener dance in textualists’ heads. But remember the electoral connection.
Can one really imagine citizens protesting on the steps of the Capitol with signs
reading, “Vote ‘No’ on lack of precision!” or “He forgot the dictionary!”? We
can with little worry of exaggerating assert that no congressman ever lost a
single vote because of a failure of semantic precision. Academic textualists
admire exactitude, consult dictionaries, and embrace the common law. Professor
Merrill has aptly described the attitude:
The textualist judge treats questions of interpretation like a puzzle to which it
is assumed there is one right answer. The task is to assemble the various
pieces of linguistic data, dictionary definitions, and canons into the best (most
coherent, most explanatory) account of the meaning of the statute. This
exercise places a great premium on cleverness. In one case the outcome turns
on the placement of a comma, in another on the inconsistency between a
comma and rules of grammar, in a third on the conflict between quotation
marks and the language of the text. One day arguments must be advanced in
support of broad dictionary definitions; the next day in support of narrow
dictionary definitions.106

But this is not what one sees when one watches committee hearings or floor
speeches on C-SPAN or reads debates in the congressional record. Senators do
not sit quietly at their desks with dictionaries in hand. House members do not
have the latest Supreme Court case on their desks, much less Blackstone or the
Federalist Papers. If there are reasons to suspect that the image of Congress as
Scrivener-in-Chief does not accord well with congressional reality, there are
also reasons to worry that it is suspiciously self-referential. Although the
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
103. As will become clear later in the Article, there are countervailing constitutional arguments. For
one thing, the Constitution itself delegates to Congress the power to create its own procedures, which
allows it to delegate to committees (for example, the power to explain text with evidence of legislative
meaning). More importantly, from my point of view, the constitutional question is not, as textualists’
claim, “What is law?” (No one thinks legislative history is law.) The question is one of institutional
choice: Which institution, the courts with their arcane common law, or the Congress with its cacophonous chorus, is a better source of ordinary meaning?
104. See generally Manning, supra note 81 (considering this question).
105. See Schacter, supra note 5, at 644–45.
106. Merrill, supra note 9, at 372 (footnotes omitted).
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scrivener model is almost completely foreign to political scientists and policy
analysts (not to mention those who work in Congress),107 it haunts lawyerly
discourse about statutory interpretation. As Professors Sunstein and Vermeule
have written, statutory interpretation theorists, as a general rule, “work with an
idealized, even heroic picture of judicial capacities and, as a corollary, a
jaundiced view of the capacities of other lawmakers and interpreters, such as
agencies and legislatures.”108 In part, this is to be expected: legal education
privileges courts mightily. Recent emphasis on administrative law is a partial antidote
to judiciocentrism; legislation courses remain heavily outnumbered. Worse, few experts in statutory interpretation have any experience in congressional lawmaking.109
Whether intentionally or not, the textualists’ dreamed scrivener image looks more like
the judiciary—a kind of junior varsity court—than Congress.
2. Two Kinds of Plain Meaning
Textualism ignores Congress’s most distinctive institutional feature: the electoral connection. As I have explained earlier,110 in both text and history, the
Congress is speaking to multiple audiences—to the people as well as the courts.
The multiple-audience problem invites us to apply “prototypical” or public
meaning. Consider, for example, Holy Trinity.111 To the average person on the
street when the act was passed in the late nineteenth century, the prototypical
meaning of “labor,” even “labor of any kind” was manual labor. As the linguist
and law professor Larry Solan has argued, ordinary meaning is prototypical
meaning, meaning that picks the “best example” rather than “all examples,” or
the conceptual or logical extension of the term.112 Such meaning identifies the
best example, not the peripheral one. In 1884 and 1885, when the bill was
debated, the prototypical case of a laborer was a miner or a railroad worker, not
a minister. Contemporary dictionaries support this view: “[t]he first definition of
the term ‘labor’ listed in the 1879 and 1886 editions of Webster’s Dictionary
was ‘Physical toil or bodily exertion . . . .’”113 As the Holy Trinity Court ex-

107. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 39, at 614–15.
108. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885,
886 (2003) (arguing that, in general, statutory interpretation theory has avoided the role of institutions).
109. For an empirical study showing this, see Dakota S. Rudesill, Comment, Closing the Legislative
Experience Gap: How a Legislative Law Clerk Program Will Benefit the Legal Profession and
Congress, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 702 (2010) (“On the most prestigious law faculties, only 5 percent
of professors have worked for a legislative institution—local, state, federal, or international.”).
110. See supra section I.A.
111. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. 457 (1892); see supra notes 83–89 and accompanying
text.
112. See Solan, supra note 49, at 2041–42.
113. Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1518. That there may have been other secondary definitions does
not detract from the fact that the vast majority of the debate about the statute in Holy Trinity concerned
the question of forced, slave-labor-type arrangements (not to mention nativist rants about low-quality
immigration) in the coal, railroad, and glass-blowing industries, all of which assume “manual labor” as
the law’s prototypical object (the best example). If we were to view legislative history as a trial record,
it would be clear error to believe that most representatives were using the term labor in the sense
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plained in defense of its prototypical approach, “the whole history and life of
the country”114 rebelled at the notion that this law, aimed at “importing laborers
as we import horses and cattle,”115 could cover the voluntary passage of a minister.
Textualists like Professor Vermeule, however, find a different, and obvious,
plain meaning: what I will call “legalist” meaning (borrowing from Professor
Vermeule, among others).116 He abstracts from the core and considers all logical
possibilities within the concept of a laborer. Where prototypical meaning looks
for the best example, legalist meaning looks for all examples, examples that by
definition push the law toward fringe or peripheral meanings.117 Labor means
labor, according to the academic textualist, and that includes the minister.
3. Textualism, Restraint, and the Expansion of Statutes’ Domains
One can conceive of the way in which legalist meaning may expand the range
of the statute in the following diagram118:

that would cover the good rector. See 15 CONG. REC. 5349–71 (1884) (House debate and passage);
15 CONG. REC. 6057–67 (1884) (Senate postponement of bill to next session). It is true, as Vermeule has
shown, that there was some debate on the scope of the legalist term “labor,” by both supporters and
opponents. Vermeule, supra note 84, at 1845–50. One of the reactions to such objections, however,
suggests the tension between popular and legalist meaning (which was apparent in the debate itself):
when questioned whether the bill would cover Lord & Taylor bringing a clerk back from abroad,
Rep. O’Neill replied,
[I]f you mean to protect American labor here is where you can show your sympathy in the
best way.
Never mind about these hair-splitting technicalities with reference to the bill; . . . remedy
any defects that you believe to exist in it. If we all had to run as constitutional lawyers, few of
us would get elected [laughter], and remember that what the workingmen ask you to do for
them is simply that this Congress shall give, so far as it can, protection to them against this
infamous contract system.
15 CONG. REC. 5358 (1884) (emphases added). The point, of course, is that linguistic clarity is not the
measure of electoral success or real-life results for labor. See 16 CONG. REC. 1781 (1885) (statement of
Sen. Platt) (“I think it illustrates the folly of a class of men who suppose that bills can be better
prepared for the consideration of Congress and passage by Congress by those who are not familiar with
legal phraseology and with the legal profession.”).
114. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 472. Holy Trinity is typically known as an “absurdity”
case. I make no claim here about whether its reference to the Blackstonian term “spirit” is worthy of
revival, nor do I make any claim about judicial use of the absurdity canon. I do note that one way of
thinking about absurdity is to view it as arising when there is a strong conflict between legalist meaning
(all workers) and prototypical meaning (manual labor or service). Compare, for example, standard
examples of absurdity: “bloodletting” (prototypical meaning: fight; legalist meaning: any bloodletting
including by a surgeon); “prison escape” (prototypical meaning: escape to flout law; legalist meaning:
any escape even if to escape fire).
115. 16 CONG. REC. 1782 (1885) (statement of Sen. Platt).
116. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 2–3 (2009); see also POSNER, supra
note 2, at 41.
117. There is an analogy here, as well, to H. L. A. Hart’s famous distinction between core and
penumbral meaning. See DAVID LYONS, MORAL ASPECTS OF LEGAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON LAW, JUSTICE, AND
POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY 84–85 (1993).
118. The emphasis here should be on “may.” In some contexts, the exact opposite proposition may
occur. My only claim is that textualism is not always a recipe for relative restraint or even the
narrowing of a statute’s boundaries.
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Figure 1. Legalist Meaning

There is nothing terribly modern about this idea. It has existed in statutory
interpretation since the sixteenth century, expressed in the shell-and-kernel
metaphor:
And the law may be resembled to a nut, which has a shell and a kernel within,
the letter of the law represents the shell, and the sense of it the kernel, and as
you will be no better for the nut if you make use only of the shell, so you will
receive no benefit by the law, if you rely only upon the letter.119

Here, the kernel represents prototypical “sense” while the shell represents the
legalist “letter of the law.” Early American courts expressed a similar idea,
quoting the Latin phrase, “qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice”: “he who sticks
to the letter of the law will only stick to its bark.”120
119. ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 4 (quoting the reporter’s commentary on Eyston v. Studd, (1574)
75 Eng. Rep. 688 (K.B.) 695–96).
120. Church v. Thomson, 1 Kirby 98, 99 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass.
(1 Tyng) 162, 183 (1811); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 14, 30 (1806); Miller’s Lessee
v. Holt, 1 Tenn. 111, 116 (Tenn. Super. L. & Eq. 1799); Olin v. Chipman, 2 Tyl. 148, 150 (Vt. 1802);
see also JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 131 (Alexander Campbell Fraser
ed., Clarendon Press 1894) (1690) (“[D]oth it not often happen, that a man of an ordinary capacity, very
well understands a text, or a law, that he reads, till he consults an [expert] expositor . . . [who] makes
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Academic textualists embrace expert, and thus peripheral, legalist meaning.
Professor Manning writes that “textualists seek out technical meaning, including the specialized connotations and practices common to the specialized
sub-community of lawyers.”121 Enforcing this focus on expert (as opposed to
prototypical) meaning is the tendency to equate text with semantics. As Professor Jonathan Molot explains, textualists tend to see “words written on a piece of
paper, rather than . . . a collective effort by elected representatives to govern on
behalf of their constituents.”122 This tendency to detach text from any larger
conversation between the public and its representatives reflects the lawyerly
love of logical puzzles.123
Indeed, the preference for legalist, peripheral meaning reveals two important
aspects of textual theory. Generally, academic textualism advertises itself as a
“restrained” view relative to “intentionalism” or “purposivism.” Although textualists claim that they, unlike purposivists, do not “add” meaning to text, in fact,
they do. They reject legislative history but add lawyerly meanings taken from
past precedents, canons of construction, and the common law. Preference for
specialized meanings speaks loudest in textualists’ affection for the “common
law” baseline. As Professor Manning explains: “Textualists assign common-law
terms their full array of common-law connotations; they supplement otherwise
unqualified texts with settled common law practices.”124 The common law is a
judicial, not a public or legislative, province. Even a committed textualist, if
asked, would not claim that legislators were common law experts. To be sure,
many legislators are lawyers, but the common law tends to be the province of
academics and judges, not the average practicing lawyer who has neither the
time nor the inclination to study Blackstone.
Critics will reply that it is not fair to tar textualism with affection for arcane
lawyerly meanings; textualists seek ordinary meanings. Justice Scalia maintains
that the appropriate procedure for determining meaning is as follows:
[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and
second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any
clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one
applies. If not—and especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning
appears plain—we apply that ordinary meaning.125

the words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases.”). Special thanks to Asher Steinberg,
Georgetown University Law Center Class of 2011, for discovering this kernel of wisdom in a number
of nineteenth-century cases.
121. Manning, supra note 2, at 434–35.
122. Molot, supra note 78, at 48.
123. Merrill, supra note 9, at 372.
124. Manning, supra note 2, at 435 (footnote omitted).
125. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphases added). In the
constitutional context, he is even more insistent. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576
(2008) (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to
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I could not agree more. There is reason to wonder, however, whether “ordinary”
meaning is too often equated with expert or specialized meaning. Law professor
and linguist Larry Solan has suggested, for example, that judges are not
consistent on this score, sometimes applying prototypical meaning and other
times applying legalist or peripheral meaning.126 In one recent study, the author
found that “when Justice Scalia says plain meaning, he refers to something
different than ‘ordinary meaning.’ ‘Plain meaning’ usually refers to a specialized but accepted meaning of a term . . . .”127 Political scientist Frank Cross
found that “[o]verall, the plain meaning standard seems ideologically manipulable and incapable of constraining preferences to provide greater consensus.”128 A more recent empirical study, conducted by Ward Farnsworth, Dustin
Guzior, and Anup Mulani, concluded that “ordinary meaning” has a tendency to
reduce ideological bias relative to plain meaning because the interpreter is
required to imagine a meaning other than what is already plain to him or her.129
Herein lies a deep and important ambiguity, even inconsistency, within
textualist theory. Textualism, for all its affection for plainness, is in fact
ambiguous on the type of meanings it will apply.130 Although some textualists
emphasize expert meaning and semantic content, others rightly emphasize
ordinary meaning. Even within a single article, some textualists equate ordinary
and specialized meaning.131 Perhaps academic textualists assume that the average citizen is a lawyer—something the voting public would find odd, if not
offensive. But perhaps that helps to explain empirical work showing that
Congress has a greater tendency to override plain meaning decisions than to
override decisions deferential to legislative history.132
Academic textualism has no theory of when to apply expert meaning and
be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary . . .
meaning.’”) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
126. See Solan, supra note 49, at 2046–47.
127. Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s
Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 149 (2008) (emphasis added).
128. CROSS, supra note 96, at 166.
129. Respondents were more likely to agree that “ordinary readers would disagree about the correct
reading” of a statute than that “the statute, as applied to [the] facts, is ambiguous”; furthermore, ideological bias more greatly influenced responses to the “ambiguous” question than the “ordinary readers”
question. See Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Mulani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An
Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation 6, 8–12 (Univ. of Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 280, 2009), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/280-am-ambig
uity.pdf. Farnsworth, Guzior and Mulani usefully distinguish between plain meaning (an “internal
view”) and ordinary meaning (“external”).
130. See Molot, supra note 78, at 36 (“[S]o long as textualism is on the attack . . . little attention is
devoted to the interpretive methodology textualism offers to replace strong purposivism and on
variations within the textualist movement.”).
131. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 84, at 1852–53.
132. See CROSS, supra note 96, at 82–83 (summarizing this evidence and relying on Daniel J. Bussel,
Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 887, 909–10
(2000), William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 350 tbl.8 (1991), and Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word:
Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 446 (1992)).
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when to apply public, or prototypical, meaning.133 It either assumes that prototypical and legalist meanings are the same, or prefers expert meaning without
defending that choice. Sophisticated textualists like Professor Manning sometimes bow to the relevant “interpretive community” but define that community
not as the people, but as expert lawyers.134 Shifting the inquiry to a “relevant
community” has the important virtue of noticing that there is an audience for
statutes, but it raises its own ambiguities: how are we to determine the relevant
audience?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, academic textualism ignores structureinduced ambiguity. Textualists tend to characterize ambiguity as a deliberate
legislative failure: Congress could have been clear, but chose not to be. Textualists criticize legislatures for manipulating courts into particular interpretations—a position I find exaggerated, if one accepts the overriding power of the
electoral connection.135 Just imagine our putative Representative going home to
claim, “I manipulated more courts than any other representative in Congress,”
rather than “I voted for war” or “I voted for deficit reduction.” Would such a
position gain him many votes and, if it would not, why are we assuming that it
is a common, as opposed to an unusual, phenomenon? The bottom line:
academic textualism waxes ambivalent on the issue of ambiguity. A theory that
assumes Congress’s chaotic nature should make ambiguity the norm: how, then,
can it insist that there are plain meanings?
B. PURPOSIVISM

If the new textualism has captured the imagination of a scholarly generation,
this was not always the case. For much of the twentieth century, courts agreed
that they should interpret statutes by looking for congressional intent. In the
postwar era, a new consensus called purposivism developed. Rather than focus
on intent, Harvard’s legal process school urged lawyers to look for the purposes
of a statute: “Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to
any subordinate provision of it which may be involved; and then . . . [i]nterpret
the words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry out the purpose
133. Note that there is no logical connection between public or prototypical meaning and Congress;
Congress may use terms in legalist or prototypical fashion. Congress, for example, may mean for the
term “utilize” to cover all cases of use (the legalist and conceptual meaning), or it may mean for the
term “utilize” to cover only particular cases involving presidential transitions. See Public Citizen v. U.S.
Dep’t. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452–54 (1989).
134. See Manning, Equity, supra note 7, at 16 & n.64 (“Textualists believe that legislation supposes
that legislators and judges are part of a common social and linguistic community, with shared
conventions for communication. Accordingly, they argue that a faithful agent’s job is to decode legislative instructions according to the common social and linguistic conventions shared by the relevant
community.”). See generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 338–54 (1980).
135. Textualists are not alone in this claim, which arises frequently in game-theory analyses of
statutory interpretation. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1417, 1442–43 (2003).
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as best it can . . . .”136 Legal process advocates used legislative history to
resolve ambiguities or find statutory purpose.
Return to Holy Trinity.137 The purposivist looks at the text and finds it
ambiguous. There are two possible meanings of laborer: laborer might mean
“all workers,” or laborer might mean “manual laborer.” Given that ambiguity,
the purposivist then looks to legislative history to discover the statute’s purpose.
According to the Court, the legislative history showed that Congress’s core
purpose was to cover large-scale operations in which corporations imported
cheap immigrant labor for mining or other industrial operations—not ministers.138 Thus, the purposivist is likely to proclaim Holy Trinity correctly decided.
Prominent academics have rightly criticized this view. As law professors
Adrian Vermeule, Bill Eskridge, and Carol Chomsky all show, the Court barely
scratched the surface of the legislative history.139 Professor Vermeule cites
legislative history suggesting that bill proponents and opponents alike thought
the bill was drafted too broadly; some representatives and Senators noted that
the bill might cover high- as well as low-class laborers.140 Professor Chomsky
rejects that view based on a review of all the legislative history, arguing that
such comments were relatively rare, compared to the vast amount of discussion
concerning manual labor and the proponents’ avowed aim to ban large-scale
slave-labor operations.141 These scholars’ disagreement tends to highlight the
textualists’ concern (a real one) that it is simply too difficult to try to read
legislators’ minds by scouring legislative history.
1. Purposivism’s Rosy Image of Congress
Now, let us consider purposivists’ view of Congress. Purposivists embrace a
rosy view of Congress. Harvard professors Hart and Sacks wrote that courts
should “assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature
was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”142 Few students of Congress, and certainly no political scientists, hold
such a view. Like the purposivists’ critics, I believe this view is far too
rosy—even if taken as a normative ideal rather than a descriptive one (what
Congress should be as opposed to what it is). Congress can only be that which
its institutional incentives—principally its electoral connections—allow it to be;
to idealize Congress simply brands purposivism as romance, not law.
Purposivists’ rosy view of Congress is just as self-referential as the textual-

136. HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 1374.
137. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
138. Id. at 463–64.
139. See Chomsky, supra note 84, at 905–08; Eskridge, supra note 74, at 1517–19. See generally
Vermeule, supra note 84.
140. See Vermeule, supra note 84, at 1850–51.
141. See Chomsky, supra note 84, at 923.
142. HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 1378.
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ists’ junior varsity court image. “Reasonable persons acting reasonably” describes judicial, not legislative, virtue: “precision in drafting, consciousness of
interpretive rules, discovery of meaning in past precedent, and detached reflection on the language of particular texts.”143 Courts prize reasonableness; they
seek rational policy (as opposed to “position taking” or symbolic action, as a
political scientist might emphasize). This should not surprise: institutions tend
to project their own values onto other institutions.144 Purposivists and textualists
in the academy project the virtues of the academy with its judiciocentric focus
onto Congress, imagining legislative institutions as courts. A sophisticated
purposivist does not need this view: to the extent that purposivists recognize
ambiguity, they should be willing to adopt a realistic view of Congress. After
all, if Congress were so reasonable, wouldn’t purposivism be unnecessary? All
statutes would be plain and consistent with their purposes.
2. Purposivism as a Theory of Deference
If purposivists acknowledge ambiguity, then jettisoning the “rosy” Hart and
Sacks theory may make good sense. In fact, purposivists’ attachment to the rosy
view may be something other than it appears. Purposivists honor the legislature’s lawmaking capacities, urging that deference to Congress’s meaning constrains judges. Under this view, the “rosy legislature” becomes less a description
of Congress and more a normative principle of deference to Congress—a
principle that few, even textualists, reject. To the extent purposivists’ view of
Congress is really a theory of deference to Congress, it declares a principle with
which no theory of statutory interpretation openly quarrels. In fact, it accords
with constitutional law’s one truism: deference to the political branches is not
just wise but constitutionally commanded.145
Another, related, way to look at the rosy view is that it is not so much a
theory of Congress as it is a theory of courts as Congress’s “faithful agent.” As
law professor Bill Eskridge puts it, good agents serve their principals’ ends by
filling in gaps and responding to real and sometimes changing circumstances. If
told to collect all the ashtrays in the building, the faithful agent does not pull the
ashtray off the wall.146 In fact, in any reasonable agency relationship, we
affirmatively do not want the agent to pull the ashtray off the wall. It is quite
possible, however, to adhere to this idea of a faithful agent—a quite sensible
one—without adopting a rosy view of Congress.

143. Nourse & Schacter, supra note 39.
144. See generally Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 757 (2009)
(arguing that the revisionist incorrectly read the Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), as a political decision because of the political nature of the Executive Branch understanding
of—and response to—the case); Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 29, at 85 (discussing claims that new
legal realism should focus on institutional forces).
145. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 142 (1893).
146. See Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 771–72 (1966).
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Let us return to Holy Trinity.147 What if purposivists were to proceed on a
less than rosy account of the legislative history? The vast majority of the
legislative history (pages upon pages) assumes manual labor as the object of
the bill, but there are moments when this is questioned, both in the House and in
the Senate. Let us assume that members were not acting as reasonable persons
acting reasonably (as judicial actors would), but as legislators trying to accommodate their constituents under pressure to reach widespread agreement. How
might this have occurred? We know that the bill’s supporters were happy with
an amendment limiting the bill to “manual” laborers (this is consistent with
their general purpose of limiting massive slave-labor immigration and with the
committee report cited by the Supreme Court).148 We also know that, at the
least, post hoc, Congress passed a bill to exclude ministers (so there were
eventually enough votes for a minister exclusion).149 Assume, however, that
when the bill was first introduced, those who opposed the bill were afraid to
oppose it openly: who could condone slave labor contracts when many legislators still remembered the call of “free labor”?150 Instead, some manufacturing
interests chose to oppose the bill by claiming it was poorly drafted and
overbroad, even unconstitutional.151 Assume further that ambiguity was the
price of passage because, in fact, manufacturing interests wanted to make labor
appear silly and uneducated, and labor supporters did not care much about the
precise language because their constituents cared more about their wages than
semantic precision. We will never know whether this story is true or not; we can
only speculate that ambiguity may have been the price the bill’s opponents
demanded for the Act’s passage.152 Given the difficulty in passing the Act,

147. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
148. Id. at 464–65 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 48-444 (1884), reprinted in 15 CONG. REC. 6059 (H.
Comm. on Labor Rep. on H.R. 2550 and H.R. 3313)); see also Vermeule, supra note 84, at 1843–44.
149. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 5, 26 Stat. 1085; see also Vermeule, supra note 84, at
1841–42 & n.38.
150. William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age,
1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 768 (outlining movements by state and federal judges to defend free labor by
striking down state economic regulations, maximum hour laws and other labor legislation).
151. See Vermeule, supra note 84, at 1846–47. The claim of constitutionality is almost impossible
for moderns to see unless they are aware of the history of equal protection, which was much more
vibrant in the late nineteenth century and went by the name of “class legislation.” Class legislation was
an argument that the legislature had exercised improper selectivity, singling out a particular group for
harsher treatment than others; its most famous nineteenth-century example is Barbier v. Connelly,
113 U.S. 27 (1885), which preceded Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), in addressing
discrimination against the Chinese. The trigger for class legislation arguments was not substantive due
process, as some have argued, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993), but statutory exemptions. This is why adding
exemptions to the bill might have appeared to pose a constitutional problem. V.F. Nourse & Sarah A.
Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955, 972, 987 (2009).
152. Bargaining theorists would tend to say that, in such a situation, the deal should be honored and
the language interpreted broadly because that was the price of bill passage. Even if we knew this to be
true (which we do not), it should not result in a legalist or peripheral interpretation of the statutory term
“labor.” As game theory posits, the price of the deal cannot be measured by those who were inveterate
opponents. And there is significant evidence that the legalist interpretation was adopted by the
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despite a broad coalition of nativists, labor, and small manufacturers, precision
in drafting may have appeared, to some, a small price to pay.153 As one
supporter claimed:
Never mind about these hair-splitting technicalities with reference to the bill;
. . . remedy any defects that you believe to exist in it. If we all had to run as
constitutional lawyers, few of us would get elected [laughter], and remember
that what the workingmen ask you to do for them is simply that this Congress
shall give, so far as it can, protection to them against this infamous contract
system.154

Purposivists need not reject this account. A purposivist may readily accept it
without claiming that legislators do, or should, act as reasonable persons acting
reasonably all of the time. In fact, purposivists who cling to the rosy vision take
the more radical position of Professor Cass Sunstein, who argues for a small-r
republican theory of statutory interpretation.155 Sunstein claims that courts
should treat Congress as grand deliberator.156 Again, evidence calls the rosy
republican ideal into question.157 For example, is the “no-compromise compromise” we saw earlier,158 in which one side concedes a point that it is not trying
to make (no “random” violence, no “highway quotas”), really a form of
deliberation? It seems rather like no deliberation. To be sure, Congress’s critics
grossly exaggerate the idea that the body never deliberates. I can think of many
cases in which Congress truly did debate questions, when members were on the
floor, on the exclusionary rule, or habeas corpus reform; indeed, as legislative
scholars know, there are inspiring examples such as the debate over congressional authorization for the first Gulf War.159 But the question of debate evades
the dominant structural incentive at play: the electoral connection. In some
cases, the electoral connection will drive serious debate, but sometimes it will
drive the opposite: no debate at all.

opponents of the bill because they could not openly oppose the bill on the merits. Indeed, applying bargaining theory in this way can easily elevate a loser’s claim into winner’s status. See infra
section II.C.
153. The suit was ultimately instigated by a railroad financier. See Chomsky, supra note 84, at 910
(“John Stewart Kennedy, a prominent banker, financier, and railroad director”).
154. Id. at 927 (emphases added) (quoting 15 CONG. REC. 5358 (1884) (statement of Rep. O’Neill)).
155. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988), with
Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685 (1988).
156. Sunstein, supra note 155 (claiming that the first principle of liberal republicanism is “deliberation in government”).
157. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673,
1674 (1988).
158. See supra section I.B (discussing the Violence Against Women Act).
159. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS 62 (3d ed. 2007).
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3. Purposivism-as-Prototypical-Meaning: Limiting Statutes’ Domains?
In my view, purposivism fares poorly as a congressional theory, but it may
make sense as something entirely different. Like other theories of interpretation,
purposivism has little regard for the electoral connection. This tells us that
sometimes statutory language is directed at the people; it is used in a prototypical vernacular as opposed to a legalist sense. One way of rehabilitating purposivism would be to reform it in light of the electoral connection. One would not
ask about the purpose of the statute simpliciter, but the purpose to the ordinary
person on the street. The first stop in that process would be to look for the text’s
prototypical meaning. As prominent textualists have argued, the text is often the
best indication of purpose.160 Just as there may be two kinds of plain meaning,
there may be two kinds of purpose—prototypical purpose (the best core purpose
to the people) and peripheral or legalist notions of purpose (all possible purposes).
One of the most powerful critiques of purposivism argues that it extends the
domain of statutes: as Judge Easterbrook once wrote, because purpose will be
more general, it will tend to expand a law’s domain.161 But as this analysis of
Holy Trinity shows, if purpose is redefined as prototypical meaning, then the
opposite may be true. According to academic textualists, like Professor Vermeule, the text is clear and includes the rector. But, if this is right, his textualism
(the legalist, extensive kind) expands the reach of the prototypical meaning of
the statute. Prototypical purpose would narrow the reach of the statute to
“manual” laborers, relative to legalist meaning (all laborers). Purposivism, then,
is not the only form of statutory interpretation having the potential to expand
statutory scope; textualism does not necessarily narrow statutory scope. As
Judge Posner has explained: “Literal interpretations can be astonishingly
broad.”162 He provides a characteristically pointed example: “Suppose you
asked a druggist for something to help you sleep and he gave you a sledgehammer.”163
Prototypical meaning carries no necessary political valence, even if it has
160. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 7, at 1316–17 (quoting Justice Scalia).
161. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 537 (1983) (“If the
question of a statute’s domain may not often be resolved by reference to actual design, it may never
properly be resolved by reference to imputed design. To impute a design to Congress is to engage in an
act of construction.”).
162. POSNER, supra note 2, at 200.
163. Id. I make no claim that legalist meaning always expands meaning, only that it may expand
meaning. As a general rule, if we define prototypical meaning as the best example and legalist meaning
as all examples, the tendency will be for legalist meaning to be more expansive than prototypical
meaning. I do not foreclose the possibility, and my argument does not depend upon the claim, that there
may be cases in which the opposite might occur, in which prototypical meaning might expand legalist
meaning. Moreover, in some cases, expansion or contraction may depend upon which piece of a text is
pulled out of the statute to consider. For example, consider Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491
U.S. 440 (1989). In that case, the term “utilize” might seem to cover the American Bar Association if
“utilize” is considered in both its prototypical (best example) and legalist (all examples) senses. But the
case looks quite different, in my view, if we consider the question as one of the prototypical “advisory
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been criticized as a conservative approach. The average exemplary meaning is
likely, in fact, to change more rapidly than would legalist meaning, because it is
subject to changes in ordinary usage and social context.164 Of course, prototypical meaning is no panacea. In many cases, Congress embraces technical meaning. When Congress legislates about the proper pleading standard in securities
actions, it cares little for what the average man on the street thinks of scienter; it
debates the difference between the expert legal standards available in the Ninth
and Second Circuits.165 Indeed, one great problem in statutory interpretation
can be in determining whether Congress used a term in a prototypical or legalist
sense. In the famous Bock Laundry case, when Congress used the term “defendant” in a federal evidentiary rule, it appeared to use the prototypical meaning
of the word—criminal defendant—because use of the term yielded absurdity or
potential unconstitutionality when the expert meaning was applied—criminal or
civil defendant.166 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as we will see in
Part III, prototypical meaning, as a method of statutory interpretation alone,
may entrench bias. (Had the statute in Holy Trinity applied to a particular
“race,” it would have relied upon the extensive prototypical meaning of that
term in the late-nineteenth century.)
If purposivism can be reconstructed to reduce the risks of statutory extension
(applicable as well to legalist textualism), it is also true that purposivism’s
theory of Congress can be revisited. There is nothing preventing purposivists
from jettisoning the Hart and Sacks rosy view of Congress; indeed, it would
only serve to strengthen the theory. Purposivists, unlike textualists, urge that
ambiguities should be resolved by looking at evidence produced by a popular
body (legislative history). That aspect of purposivism would only be strengthened by a minimalist, evidence-based view of Congress.
C. GAME THEORY

In recent years, scholars have brought game theory to legislative studies.
Bill Eskridge and John Ferejohn led the theoretical charge, masterfully analyzing the Court–Congress–President game.167 More recently, law professor Daniel
Rodriguez teamed up with eminent Harvard political scientist Barry Weingast to
apply the insights of game theory to interpret specific statutes,168 following
seminal articles by McNollgast and others on the positive political theory of

committee.” This question of which piece of text one chooses to focus upon may be central to the
interpretation.
164. See VERMEULE, supra note 8, at 46–49.
165. See Grundfest & Pritchett, supra note 55, at 652–53.
166. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
167. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 54.
168. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory
Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207 (2007) [hereinafter Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox];
Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 135.
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statutory interpretation.169 Game theory uses bargaining theory to understand
the deal struck by Congress.170 Judges and statutory theorists have suggested
“imaginative [deal] reconstruction” for years.171 Judge Learned Hand and Judge
Posner have advocated such an approach.172 Game theory provides a seemingly
more sophisticated analytic veneer, adding a new vocabulary of “cheap talk,”
“costly concessions,” and “signaling.”
1. Game Theory as Orthogonal to Academic Textualism
Although textualists often cite game theorists as allies,173 the theories are
quite distinct, even orthogonal. Textualists reject intentionalism and legislative
history. Game theorists eagerly dive into the legislative history; their aim is
to create a more “scientific” intentionalism.174 Rather than picking out one’s
friends at a schmoozy cocktail party (to paraphrase the famous Leventhal quip),
game theorists aim to create a scientific theory of legislative rhetoric that weeds
out unreliable from reliable legislative history.
As McNollgast put it over a decade ago, “ascertaining legislative intent
requires separating the meaningless actions (or signals) of participants in the
legislative process from the consequential signals that are likely to reveal
information about the coalition’s intentions.”175 “[C]heap talk” is “communication that is costless for the speaker to make and that is unverifiable and therefore
untrustworthy,” and “costly signaling” is defined as “communication where the
speaker pays a price for inaccuracies.”176 Costly signals can be trusted; cheap
talk cannot. For example, in Holy Trinity, the original committee report supporting a “manual labor” interpretation would be cheap talk177 because the authors
anticipated that the bill would not pass—there was no actual legislative cost to
making such a statement.
Curiously, game theory relies in significant part on a legal, as opposed to a
political, theory of legislation. Statutes are contracts: “Both formalize bargains
169. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992); McNollgast, supra note 31, at 3; McNollgast, supra note 56; McNollgast,
The Theory of Interpretive Canon and Legislative Behavior, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 235 (1992).
170. In this section, I consider only game theory models. Positive political theory (PPT) can also be
used much more loosely. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory
in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 457–63 (1991) (discussing various meanings of PPT).
171. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
172. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 194 (quoting Judge Learned Hand, who sought to “reconstruct the past solution imaginatively in its setting and project the purposes which inspired it upon the
concrete occasions which arise for their decision”).
173. When textualists cite positive political theorists as allies, they are typically citing to that strain
of positive political theory that Gerry Mackie calls the “irrationalist” thesis, following William Riker’s
work on Arrow’s Theorem. See MACKIE, supra note 59, at 23, 156.
174. There is some difference on this issue among positive political theorists. See, e.g., Shepsle,
supra note 65.
175. McNollgast, supra note 31, at 7.
176. Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 168, at 1220.
177. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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among actors with diverse and partially conflicting interests.”178 As in contract
law, “the role of the courts is to fill in the gaps in legislation by interpreting the
intentions of the law’s enacting coalition.”179 Just as a court finds the “actual
agreement” of contractual parties, game theory aspires to find the “original
intent” of legislation.180 The contractual analogy explains why McNollgast
rejects academic textualists’ distaste for legislative history: “One cannot argue
that a contract between two parties does not embody their mutual agreement
because both parties delegated the negotiation to their lawyers and then signed
it after only superficial perusal of its contents.”181 McNollgast rejects textualism’s willingness to blind itself to relevant information: “Theoretically wellgrounded interpretations of legislative signals will produce better information
than poorly grounded readings of the history or than a decision to ignore all of
the history because some of it is uninformative.”182
2. Game Theory’s Bargain Bazaar Image of Congress
Given its emphasis on contract, it is not surprising that game theorists’ idea of
Congress is neither devil nor angel, but something akin to the marketplace. In
an early paper, McNollgast made clear that the analogy to contract was based on
the “economic approach to the law of contracts,” which “evaluates legal regimes according to their efficiency.”183 Legal rules increasing the cost of
negotiation were disfavored; common law rules were viewed as efficient to the
extent that they furthered the purposes of the contracting parties.184 Similarly,
rules of statutory construction should be created to increase efficiency: “Viewed
in the light of contract law, the purpose of canons of statutory interpretation is to
facilitate legislative agreements and thereby advance the efficiency of the
legislative process.”185 This, they contended, could be accomplished by scouring the legislative history to find the moderate coalition necessary for bill
passage: “Consequently, if statutory interpretation is guided by the principle of
honoring the spirit of the legislative bargain, it must not focus only on the
preferences of the ardent supporters, but also on the accommodations that were
necessary to gain the support of the moderates.”186
As we have seen for textualism and purposivism, a contract theory of
Congress fails to accord with our two minimalist principles: the electoral
connection and the supermajoritarian difficulty. Unlike businessmen who are
contracting, legislators are speaking to their constituents as much as to each

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

McNollgast, supra note 31, at 9.
See id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 11 n.23.
Id. at 25.
McNollgast, supra note 56, at 708.
See id.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 711–12.
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other. The contract analogy fails to take into account what evidence-based
theory predicts: that there may be no contract. Sophisticated game theorists
know that signals to third parties may be crucial to the game, but game theoretic
analyses of legislative history have ignored this vertical dimension. Like textualism and purposivism, first generation game theoretic statutory interpretation
focuses on the horizontal relationship between courts and Congress, not Congress and its electoral audience. Moreover, as we will see, however sophisticated game theory appears, it may fail—at least in particular applications—to
consider basics such as the supermajoritarian difficulty.
Consider Rodriguez and Weingast’s analysis of the Tower Amendment to
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Their argument proceeds as follows: The 1964
Civil Rights Act was the product of congressional compromise between the
Humphrey majority and the Dirksen moderates.187 Relying only on Senator
Humphrey’s “winner’s history,” they argue, “devalues the pivotal role of moderate legislators whose assent is essential to reaching a bargain that can achieve
majority (and, because of the filibuster, super-majority) support.”188 Rodriguez
and Weingast explain:
For example, speeches made at the introduction of legislation are ordinarily
cheap talk. This stage occurs before any of the legislative compromises
necessary to pass the act and, therefore, cannot reflect the critical compromise
provisions in the final act. . . .
In contrast, discussions on the floor of the legislative chamber that focus on
the meaning of critical compromises offered in amendments are costly signals. Because they risk losing the votes of the moderates, ardent supporters
pay a large price for attempts to downplay or inaccurately describe the
compromise during floor debates preceding acceptance of the compromise.189

There is much to commend in this passage. Bill supporters do wax lofty: We
will “end child poverty in America,” “rid the airwaves of poisonous political
advertisements,” or “end violence in our time.” This is cheap talk. So, too, game
theory recognizes what courts often do not: the dangers of “loser’s” history. Just
as ardent supporters are likely to engage in lofty rhetoric in support of a bill,
ardent opponents are likely to engage in lofty rhetoric: “Members who voted
against the legislation in key votes, who filed minority reports against the
legislation in committee, and who offered rejected amendments to kill or gut the
legislation should be regarded as outside the enacting coalition, even if they
voted in favor of the bill on final passage.”190 There is much to admire in this,
relative to the tendency of lawyers to slice and dice the congressional record
without any thought to whether those cited opposed or supported the bill. The

187.
188.
189.
190.

Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 135, at 1427.
Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 168, at 1215, 1218.
Id. at 1220–21.
McNollgast, supra note 31, at 21.
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question, however, remains whether game theory ignores the very institutional
processes it aims to honor.
Putting aside any larger claims about game theory for the moment, let us take
one of Rodriguez and Weingast’s specific examples, the statute underlying the
Griggs case involving employee testing.191 Senator Tower offered an amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, making explicit the power of companies to
test employees. The conventional story is that Senator Tower was particularly
concerned about overruling an Illinois employment decision, Motorola, which
struck down testing because of the “disadvantaged” background of those taking
the test—an extreme form of disparate impact theory, which would have
virtually eliminated testing and which no Senator supported.192 Tower’s first
amendment encountered resistance because it applied to all “professionally
developed ability test[s]” that determine whether employees are “suitable.”193
In theory, as opponents suggested, this could mean “any test.” (One imagines
giving the MCAT to janitors.) The amendment failed to pass.194 Later on,
Senator Tower offered another version of the amendment and Senator Humphrey, manager of the bill, conceded to the new version.195 This, Rodriguez and
Weingast call a “costly signal.”196 Based on this, Rodriguez and Weingast argue
that the Tower Amendment should be given a broad interpretation and that
Griggs was incorrectly decided.197 Tower said “any professionally developed
ability test,”198 and the Griggs majority deferred to the EEOC’s rule that testing
had to be “job-related.”199 According to Rodriguez and Weingast, the Dirksen
amendments were “pivotal” to the success of the bill; these included the Tower
Amendment, and it should be given its full meaning, which the Griggs Court
did not do.200 My argument is not with their conclusion but with this particular
191. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 135, at 1501–10 (discussing Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d, 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). Note that this analysis does not necessarily
apply to any of the other examples used by Rodriquez and Weingast.
192. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,492–94 (1964) (statement of Sen. Tower) (discussing Myart v. Motorola, Inc., No. 63C-127 (Ill. Fair Emp’t Practices Comm’n Feb. 27, 1964), reprinted in 110 CONG.
REC. 5662-64 (1964)); see also Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 135, at 1505–06.
193. The first Tower Amendment was offered post-cloture on June 11, 1964. 110 CONG. REC. 13,492
(1964) (amend. no. 606). Its language is quoted in full infra note 209.
194. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 135, at 1506 (“Tower’s first amendment was defeated on a
roll call vote, 38 to 49.”).
195. 110 CONG. REC. 13,724 (1964) (amend. no. 952); see also Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note
135, at 1506.
196. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 135, at 1506.
197. Id. at 1507 (arguing that the Griggs Court decided that “the expressed understanding of the
ardent supporters (Humphrey’s view about what the Tower Amendment meant) should determine the
meaning of an ambiguous statute” but pointing out that “by accepting the second Tower amendment,
the ardent supporters receded from this view”).
198. 110 CONG. REC. 13,492 (1964). For the text of the amendment, see infra note 209.
199. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1239–40 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d, 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
200. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 135, at 1508 (“The fact that a majority of the Senate voted
in favor of the amendment makes the supporters’ position—essentially the position that . . . would
prevail later in Griggs—precarious.”). Rodriguez and Weingast also emphasize that even though there
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analysis of the Tower Amendment.
3. Game Theory and the Supermajoritarian Difficulty
As I have indicated, game theory is more finely attuned to congressional
action than is purposivism or textualism. And yet game theory may yield flawed
results if it does not pay sufficient attention to the particular institutional
realities shaping the legislative deal. As we have seen in Part I, structure induces
ambiguity, a product of the electoral connection plus the supermajoritarian
difficulty. As the political scientist Keith Krehbiel has made clear, and firsthand
accounts of the Congress corroborate, getting to sixty votes is central to any
bargain in the Senate.201 Game theorists are correct that the majority seeks
moderate votes clustered around a pivot; the crucial pivot, however, is cloture.
Senators willing to resist cloture may demand changes to the bill as a price for
their vote to close debate.202 So in the Civil Rights Act, H.R. 7152, the original
bill before the Senate was not the bill considered after cloture. Instead, there
was a “substitute” bill (styled as an amendment but which struck out the entire
original bill). A substitute representing the basic negotiations—the Mansfield–
Dirksen substitute—was Dirksen’s price for cloture (which then required sixtyseven votes).203 There is nothing unusual about this procedure; it happens to
any bill with salient or controversial provisions.
Given this process, one has to be concerned about Rodriguez and Weingast’s
analysis of the Tower Amendment. They claim, for example, that the Tower

was no recorded vote on the second Tower Amendment, it would have included “the thirty-eight who
made up the group supporting the first Tower amendment,” and that this number was sufficient to
prevent cloture. See id. at 1507. Note in regard to the last claim that, once cloture has been invoked,
which it had been by June 11, moderates had no power to filibuster again.
201. See KREHBIEL, supra note 17, at 13, 101; see also BRADY & VOLDEN, supra note 31, at 1, 15,
156.
202. This is too simplistic a calculus, as the concessions extorted may be completely unrelated to the
bill in question or even the text. As we will see below, one of the problems with contract-based models
is that there is no guarantee that bargaining occurs on questions of text at all, or whether the bargaining
occurs across bills, nominations, or any other legislative matter. See infra text accompanying notes 216–23.
203. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 142 (1990) (“But hard bargaining for Senate
cloture dominated the next three months, and necessarily involved some trade-offs in response to
Dirksen’s artful probes.”); John G. Stewart, Thoughts on the Civil Rights Bill, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION, at 93, 113 (Robert D. Loevy ed.,
1997) (notes of John G. Stewart, an important congressional staff member, stating that “[n]o agreements will be made until the quid pro quo has been established; namely, that we get cloture activity
from Dirksen”); id. at 117 (“In short, we want cloture on the whole bill . . . and if Dirksen is not willing
to go this route then there is really no business to talk to him about his amendments.”); see also id. at
141 (“Those few amendments which were adopted after cloture resulted from the persistent efforts of
their sponsors and from Humphrey’s willingness to be accommodating and helpful wherever he
could.”). The Mansfield–Dirksen substitute was introduced on May 26; the cloture vote occurred on
June 10. Id. at 129; John G. Stewart, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Tactics II, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION, supra, at 275, 282. The first Tower
Amendment was offered on June 11. 110 CONG. REC. 13,492 (1964). The second Tower Amendment
was agreed to by voice vote on June 13. 110 CONG. REC. 13,724 (1964).
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Amendment should be respected as essential to moderate pivotal legislators.204
Senator Tower was not a moderate legislator but a serious opponent who fought
and voted against the bill, which even Rodriguez and Weingast acknowledge.205
If McNollgast is right, then Tower’s statements about the scope of the bill
amount to cheap talk. In particular, his discussion of Motorola in connection
with the first Tower Amendment (which never passed) should be viewed with
skepticism, rather than embraced with enthusiasm.206
Much more importantly, this particular analysis violates the supermajoritarian
principle. The Tower Amendment could not have been the price of cloture, even
if it had been offered by Senator Dirksen, a moderate. In the Senate’s supermajoritarian world, whether or not the opposition will filibuster is the essence of
the deal. Given such rules, whether any particular post-cloture amendment fails
is irrelevant because the pivot has been obtained: the minority has conceded that
debate be closed. Once cloture is invoked, everything that happens after cloture
is subject to stand-alone majoritarian votes.207 Tower’s amendment was a
post-cloture amendment and therefore was outside the price Dirksen’s moderate
coalition was capable of forcing Humphrey and the majority to pay. By definition, post-cloture amendments cannot be the price of a bill in toto.208

204. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 135, at 1504 (“[M]oderate legislators worried that section
703(h) would nonetheless be read by the courts to outlaw employments tests. Senator Tower’s
introduction of an amendment after the presentation of the Clark–Case memorandum provides the best
evidence of this concern among the moderates.”). If “pivotal legislators” were not convinced by the
Clark–Case memorandum and required a testing amendment to approve of the bill, it would have been
included in the Mansfield–Dirksen substitute.
205. Id. (linking Senator Tower to pivotal moderate legislators); cf. id. at 1507 (recognizing that
Tower was an “ardent opponent of the Act”); id. at 1508 (recognizing that “Tower and his ardentopponent colleagues would vote against the Civil Rights Act”). Because of this, Rodriguez and
Weingast claim that Humphrey’s costly concession to the Tower Amendment had to be directed to
moderates. No doubt Humphrey’s staff had been negotiating with moderates, but it is also true that the
moderates were not empowered to filibuster the entire bill after cloture had been invoked.
206. Rodriguez and Weingast take the conventional view that the Motorola decision was a proxy for
“disparate impact” analysis rejected by Tower, conceded by Humphrey, and then wrongly accepted by
the Griggs Court. See id. at 1501–09. In fact, as Bill Eskridge has argued, the idea that disparate impact
was in the minds of the legislators in 1964 is highly anachronistic. The concept simply did not exist.
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 74 (“[T]he legal world was stunned by the Supreme Court’s unanimous
adoption of a disparate impact approach in Griggs . . . .”). There is also no indication from the record
itself, other than the discussion about Motorola, with which all Senators disagreed, that the parties were
actually arguing about the concept in the ways that we understand it today. Lawyers tend to read into
the discussion the present of the bill, rather than its inchoate past. Both sides agreed that Motorola went
too far before the second Tower Amendment was accepted. But Motorola cannot be equated with
disparate impact because disparate impact is rebuttable evidence of discrimination whereas Motorola
created a per se rule. Nor can Motorola be equated with Griggs: the EEOC’s “job-related” rule
attempted to eliminate the most egregious forms of abuse. See id.
207. Senate rules require that all post-cloture amendments must be filed before the cloture vote. See
Stewart, Thoughts on the Civil Rights Bill, supra note 203, at 143 (“Once cloture has been invoked,
only those amendments which have been ‘presented and read’ [prior to the cloture vote] qualify for
consideration . . . .”).
208. To be sure, when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was still possible to filibuster by
amendment, but there is no indication, nor argument by Rodriguez and Weingast, that this is their
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The first Tower Amendment209 included language that would have allowed
businesses to test for “suitability.”210 That term, of course, might invite discrimination if it included tests based on “customer appeal.” Opponents of the first
Tower Amendment claimed just that: the amendment would permit intentional
discrimination.211 The second Tower Amendment, to which the majority agreed,
did not include the suitability language; Tower had to make a costly concession,
claim. In fact, any thought there would be such a filibuster was soon put to rest in the actual bill.
Stewart, Thoughts on the Civil Rights Bill, supra note 203, at 141.
209. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 135, at 1506. The first amendment provided as follows:
On page 35, after line 20, insert the following new subsection:
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give any professionally developed ability test to any
individual seeking employment or being considered for promotion or transfer, or to act in
reliance upon the results of any such test given to such individual, if—
(1) in the case of any individual who is seeking employment with such employer, such test
is designed to determine or predict whether such individual is suitable or trainable with
respect to his employment in the particular business or enterprise involved, and such test is
given to all individuals seeking similar employment with such employer without regard to the
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or
(2) in the case of any individual who is an employee of such employer, such test is
designed to determine or predict whether such individual is suitable or trainable with respect
to his promotion or transfer within such business or enterprise, and such test is given to all
such employees being considered for similar promotion or transfer by such employer without
regard to the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
110 CONG. REC. 13,492 (1964) (emphases added). The second Tower Amendment was modified as
follows before passage:
On page 44, line 15, insert the following after the word “origin”; nor shall it be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is
not designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
110 CONG. REC. 13,724 (1964). The resulting statute reads:
Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of production; ability tests; compensation based
on sex and authorized by minimum wage provisions.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who
work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is
not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006) (emphases added).
210. In Motorola, a hearing examiner in Illinois ruled that a general ability test in considering
applicants for assembly line jobs was discriminatory on the theory that the test was unfair to “culturally
deprived and disadvantaged groups.” See Myart v. Motorola, Inc., No. 63C-127 (Ill. Fair Emp’t
Practices Comm’n Feb. 27, 1964), reprinted in 110 CONG. REC. 5662–64 (1964).
211. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 13,503–04 (1964) (statement of Sen. Case) (“Discrimination could
actually exist under the guise of compliance with the statute.”).
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narrowing his provision. The amendment also added language barring the use of
tests “designed, intended or used” to discriminate. Again, these were concessions Senator Tower made to those who argued that his amendment would
permit intentional discrimination.
Humphrey and the majority also had to make a concession, albeit one
prompting legal ambiguity. First, there is the obvious ambiguity of the term
“used” to discriminate, which presumably included something more than “intentional” discrimination. Second, and more importantly, the majority accepted a
special sentence on testing that the bill managers thought redundant. Bill
supporters believed that the first sentence in subsection (h) covered the testing
issue by allowing “bona fide” merit systems. Senator Humphrey insisted that
the first Tower Amendment was unnecessary.212 When asked why, Senator
Miller responded that the bona fide merit provisions already in section (h)
covered bona fide testing so that the only thing the amendment might do was to
encourage illegitimate testing.213 If the majority believed that the testing amendment was redundant, there is no reason why it should not have agreed to it on
the theory that it was giving nothing away. As we have seen in Part I, to keep a
bill moving, there is always an incentive to logroll language—to add language
that satisfies a particular senator’s electoral needs. Any lawyer worth his salt
might have looked at the actual language and told the majority that the
amendment created legal ambiguity (now there were two provisions on testing),
but it was the end of “the longest debate”214 on an excruciatingly important
bill.215 As a general rule, post-cloture amendments are likely to be sloppier than

212. Id. at 13,504 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (“These tests are legal. They do not need to be
legalized a second time. . . . That is why I said I did not think the proposed new language was
necessary.”); see also id. at 13,503–04 (statement of Sen. Case) (“I object to the amendment suggested
by the Senator from Texas because, first, it is unnecessary . . . . The amendment is unnecessary . . . .”).
Senator Miller asked the managers whether the right to give tests was already authorized under
subparagraph (h) of the then extant bill: “I believe that during the development of the [substitute]
amendment, the question of its not being an unfair labor practice for an employer to provide for the
furnishing of employment [testing] pursuant to a bona fide . . . merit system . . . was discussed.” Id. at
13,504. Senator Humphrey replied that this was indeed covered by subparagraph (h). See id.
213. See id. at 13,503–04.
214. See CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985); see also THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at vii (Robert D. Loevy ed.,
1997) (“This titanic legislative struggle produced the longest continuous debate ever held in the U.S.
Senate.”).
215. The first sentence in section (h) addresses bona fide merit systems. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(2006). The second sentence is the testing provision. See id. Because the second sentence does not
contain the term “bona fide,” one standard lawyerly inference is that this qualification was not intended;
even if supporters like Senator Miller, see supra note 212, seemed to believe testing was already
covered under the bona fide provisions. On another reading, however, the sentences should be read in
harmony: why should one want to permit non-bona-fide testing if one wanted to bar non-bona-fide
merit systems? Even Senator Tower admitted during the debate on the first Tower Amendment that his
amendment would not sanction discriminatory tests. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,492 (1964). Moreover,
unlike the first sentence, which explicitly bars bona fide systems intended to discriminate, the second
sentence provides that testing may not be used to discriminate. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Special
thanks to President Reagan’s former General Counsel to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-

1162

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 99:1119

the language of the substitute (which tends to be more carefully crafted).
Now, this particular critique does not indict all game theory analyses, but it
does raise the problem of reading legislative bargains without regard to the
rules. First, this particular analysis raises questions of internal consistency to
game theory’s own principles because Senator Tower opposed the bill. Second,
it ignores the supermajoritarian difficulty: a post-cloture amendment is by
definition not the price of cloture. Third, and most importantly, it provokes the
question whether game theory assumes what it must prove. Remember our first
principle of a minimalist, evidence-based theory: the electoral connection. If the
electoral connection induces ambiguity, then one must begin to question one of
the principal assumptions of game theory—that statutes are contracts and
legislatures are markets. Game theory assumes that there was a deal when a
minimalist, evidence-based theory suggests there are often no deals but, instead,
false compromises, structure-induced ambiguities, and logrolling redundancies.
4. When a Deal Is Not a Deal
Like purposivism and textualism, deal reconstruction pays little attention to
constituency talk or what some game theorists call “audience costs.” As game
theorists and political scientists Nolan McCarty and Tim Groseclose explained
in a sophisticated model of presidential–congressional relations, “[a]lmost all
models of bargaining ignore the possibility that the two primary negotiators
want to send signals to a third party.”216 Political scientists studying international affairs, such as James Fearon, have known for some time that game
theory must take into account audience costs, by which they mean costs to the
domestic audience of particular position taking in international conflicts.217
Remember Mayhew’s cacophonous Congress: Senators are speaking to their
constituents as much as to their congressional opponents.218 It is entirely
possible that the deal makers are not talking to each other at all. Instead, the cost
to constituents drives the bargain. Analyses of cheap talk and signaling focus on
parties in the horizontal Court–President–Congress dimension.219 But if signaling is also intended to satisfy the electoral, third-party connection, the cost
calculus may well overemphasize the costs of horizontal signals.
Reconsider a game theory analysis of the Tower Amendment including the
electoral connection. Rodriquez and Weingast assume that moderates’ concessions should be given more weight by courts. But what if the moderates’
concessions were not in fact concessions? As we have seen, Senator Humphrey
and others believed the Tower Amendment was redundant.220 Given their bill

sion, Professor Charles Shanor, for affirming that this interpretation is consistent with the EEOC’s
understanding.
216. Groseclose & McCarty, supra note 57.
217. See Fearon, supra note 57.
218. MAYHEW, supra note 12, at 106.
219. See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 135, at 1526–29.
220. See supra note 212.
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supporters, they had every reason to emphasize redundancy. So, too, Senator
Tower may have cared little about whether his amendment was repetitive. The
Senator from Texas may have relished relitigating an issue raised by the Senator
from Illinois—Motorola was an Illinois case after all—even though Dirksen had
lost the point in the compromise negotiations prior to cloture. As Senator
Humphrey put it: Motorola had been “discussed, discussed, and cussed” in the
negotiations.221 Redundant or not, the cost of ambiguity was low relative to the
gain in constituent support for the majority and minority. Senator Tower could
go home and claim that his amendment promoted business interests and interred
Motorola. Senators Humphrey and Case (opponents of the amendment) could
go home and claim that they had stopped the Republicans from allowing any
professionally developed test. In short, what game theory sees as a significant
cost from a horizontal perspective may disappear from a vertical one (the
electoral audience).
Game theory’s failure to incorporate audience costs is not a small, technical
objection; it is a large, theoretical one. There is every reason to believe, for
example, that the vertical, electoral connection will trump horizontal ambiguity
costs. To be sure, legislators have an interest in making a bill effective, so they
should want courts to interpret the bill to make it work. Timing, however, makes
it likely that the vertical may trump this horizontal concern. A representative’s
electoral fate depends upon the claim that she has done something; a court may
undo that, but the judicial intervention is likely to be long after the election. For
example, the Violence Against Women Act’s civil-rights remedy was passed in
1994 but was not found unconstitutional until six years later (three House
electoral cycles).222 Moreover, even if a court rules against the representative,
that might not yield electoral costs; it might simply add to the salience and
importance of the member’s position. More people might vote for her precisely
because a court rejected her position.
The theoretical problem is more than game specification; the theoretical
problem lies in assuming that deals can be understood outside a particular
institutional structure. Game theory assumes that a deal is a deal, whether it
exists in business, the international arena, or a legislature. It fails to appreciate
that institutions may change the nature of the bargaining. As Professor John
Ferejohn (a savvy political theorist) has explained, the idea of “separability”—
the notion that preferences are exogenous to institutions—is radical and “likely
to be wrong.”223 Without understanding how institutions change the game,
game theory produces a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you accept that there is a
contract, then it follows that the contract should be honored. But this is too
simple an understanding of congressional bargaining—our best evidence tells us
that what looks like a deal may be no deal at all (or at least a different deal than

221. 110 CONG. REC. 13,504 (1964).
222. See supra note 58.
223. Ferejohn, supra note 101, at 74.
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one perceived by a court based on text alone). In fact, statutes are less like
contracts and more like elections. They are winner-take-all. Whether the final
tally was close, 99–1 or 61–39, matters not at all to a judge, and rightly so.
Judges risk significant errors if they seek to enforce the views of moderate
coalitions. The most important risk is in assuming that there is a moderate
coalition for any particular statutory text. Neither Senator Dirksen in the compromise negotiations nor Senator Tower in his amendment had enough votes to
pass a bill allowing a company to use any “professionally developed” test. If a
court were to assume, counterfactually, that Senator Tower was a moderate and
his first, losing amendment was necessary to the deal, enforcing it would give
an avowed opponent of the bill far more power in court than he had in
Congress. Reconstructing no-deal as if it were a deal amounts to judicial
activism on behalf of legislative minorities. The Senate already provides enormous structural protection for minorities. As Professor Levinson and Professor
Dahl have explained, very small populations have enormous power in the
Senate, even in a system requiring only fifty-one votes. The filibuster only
enhances the minority’s power. If, in a true majoritarian (fifty-one vote) system,
there were sufficient votes to pass a bill without the filibuster-induced moderate
coalition, then a court adopting the minority coalition’s interpretation may
reproduce the effects of a filibuster rule by means of statutory interpretation. In
such a case, courts risk activism on behalf of a superminority falsely dubbed a
majority.
III. THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THEIR IDEAS OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
“Nothing that is human escapes statutory interest.”
—Bill Eskridge224

All theories of statutory interpretation worry about judicial lawmaking. That
worry is not simply a question of judicial activism, but of constitutional power.
Professor Jerry Mashaw has argued that statutory interpretation theories must be
constitutional theories.225 Professor Manning agrees: “[I]t is difficult to avoid
the relevance of the constitutional structure in evaluating methods of statutory
interpretation . . . .”226 Mashaw and Manning are right: at least implicitly, the
claim of activism or judicial lawmaking is an assertion by one department over
the constitutional powers of another. That is a question of the separation of
powers. And yet no scholar has attempted to provide a theory of statutory

224. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 8 (1994).
225. Mashaw, supra note 155, at 1686.
226. John F. Manning, Statutory Pragmatism and Constitutional Structure, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1161,
1163 (2007).
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interpretation grounded in the Constitution entire.227
This question should be more important because many ideas of Congress now
most powerful in the statutory interpretation literature acknowledge gaps or
ambiguity in statutes. Textualists’ chaos theory implies vast gaps. Purposivists
assume that courts will partner in filling gaps. So, even if one rejects the theory
I propounded in Part I, one should at least consider the risk that interpreters will
improperly exercise lawmaking power. That in turn should make more urgent
the question of what power “lawmaking” is and how that power should be
exercised in a system of separated powers.
Since Alexander Bickel articulated the countermajoritarian difficulty, courts
have worried about exercising legislative power in striking down laws as unconstitutional. In fact, there may be more reasons to worry about the exercise of
statutory interpretation given the supermajoritarian difficulty. If a court errs, it
may enshrine in law that which is directly contrary to the will not only of a
majority but a supermajority. And, yet, as a relative matter, courts exercising the
power of judicial review to strike down a statute as unconstitutional are more
conscious of the potential to aggrandize their power. In statutory interpretation
cases, courts have no long or overt tradition of self-conscious constitutional
self-control about exercising their lawmaking powers, and their decisions (if in
error) are far less likely to be seen as a question of aggrandizing power as they
are likely to be wrapped in the mantra of legislative intent, even if they
contravene supermajoritarian preferences.
That faulty statutory interpretations may be overridden does not repair
this problem; it may lull courts into a false sense of security that their errors
will be easily reversed. There may well be many statutory interpretation cases
that deserve to be overridden as a matter of simple majoritarian will, but will
not because of the supermajoritarian difficulty. Once the court rules, one can
never go back; the political landscape has changed because one side of the
political debate can now invoke the rule of law in favor of its interpretation; the
original supermajoritarian coalition is impossible to reconstruct. Given already
scarce legislative resources and demands on legislators’ time, the idea that
“Congress can always override” should not relieve courts of worrying far more
explicitly about aggrandizing their power in statutory interpretation.
That statutory interpretation has not been grounded in the separation of
powers should be more surprising because, in fact, just as theories of statutory
interpretation assume a theory of Congress, they also assume a theory of the
separation of powers. In this Part, I set forth those theories and critique them.
I offer an alternate way of conceiving of the separation of powers, grounded in
the Federalist Papers and based on the representational texts of the Constitu-

227. A claim based on the separation of powers is different from a claim that structure in some way
supports a particular theory of statutory interpretation. See infra note 267 (discussing John Manning’s
claims about why structure militates against purposivism).

1166

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 99:1119

tion, a theory I have elaborated elsewhere at some length.228 As applied, that
theory supports a public meaning approach toward statutory interpretation, one
which demands that courts not blind themselves to legislative history as evidence of ordinary or public meaning.
A. TEXTUALISM, PURPOSIVISM, AND GAME THEORY AS FORMALISM AND
FUNCTIONALISM

There are two primary theories of the separation of powers: one dubbed
“formalist,” the other dubbed “functionalist.” The formalist draws bright lines
separating the departments and resists structural innovations. The functionalist
tolerates departmental overlap and embraces structural change. The formalist
invokes functional labels (“the executive power”) with enormous significance,
prizing precise descriptive separation; the functionalist relies, like the formalist,
on functional labels (separating out powers in terms of kinds) but acknowledges
that the Constitution’s text provides for both separated and shared powers.229
The Supreme Court has adopted neither theory, shifting back and forth between
them.230
1. Textualism as a Formalist Theory of the Separation of Powers
As we have seen, academic textualism embraces elite lawyerly meanings,
relying upon canons and common law to fill legislative gaps. In this sense,
textualism asserts, or at least assumes, a formal and unitary theory of the
separation of powers. If a court must fill a gap in a statute, it should use judicial,
not legislative, meanings (canons, common law, precedent). This is reinforced
by the textualists’ injunction to not look at legislative history. Separation of
powers formalists imagine (counterfactually) that the constitutional text creates
functionally pure categories. This explains statutory interpretation scholars’
battles about the meaning of “judicial power.”231 It also explains textualists’
embrace of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause: that Clause applies only
when lawmaking power is at issue.
Very few separation of powers scholars would recognize either of these

228. See Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749 (1999) [hereinafter
Nourse, Vertical]; Nourse, supra note 7; V. F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy,
56 STAN. L. REV. 835 (2004) [hereinafter Nourse, Anatomy].
229. For a succinct and careful description of formalism and functionalism, see Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Comment, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78,
91–101 (1995). On the relationship between formalism and functionalism, see Rebecca L. Brown,
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1530 (1991) (arguing that the debate
surrounding both models “hangs in midair, moored to no grander objective”); see also Peter L. Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—a Foolish Inconsistency?,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 488–94 (1987) (rejecting formalism in favor of functionalism for the
administrative levels of government).
230. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983),
with Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
231. See Eskridge, supra note 7; Manning, Equity, supra note 7.
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claims as a theory of the separation of powers. Neither has been consistently
adopted by the Supreme Court, or scholars, as a theory of the separation of
powers.232 We have three departments, not one; any theory of the separation of
powers must explain their relationship. Perhaps more importantly, any attempt
to define judicial or legislative power apart from the separation of powers is
anti-originalist, for neither the members of the Constitutional Convention nor
the constitutional ratifiers viewed the departments as in the least separable.
Indeed, they spent most of their time arguing about how the departments should
be related to one another and whether one would be too dependent on the
other.233 Madison rejected “parchment barrier” solutions such as the textual
injunction in the Massachusetts constitution to “separate” the departments234
because these textual provisions had failed in practice in state constitutions long
before the Constitutional Convention.235 One need not scour a lengthy history
for this; just read the Federalist Papers sequentially from No. 46 through
No. 51.
On structural matters I am “decidedly conservative” and “deeply reverent”
of the Founders’ plan.236 From that perspective, I worry about a false essentialism in the separation of powers. The Constitution’s text does not create separate
departments along functional lines. The President’s veto power is under Article I,
not II, as “legislative power”; the Congress’s power to adjudicate impeachments
is under Article II, not Article III.237 More importantly, the text upon which
formalists typically rely—the Vesting Clauses238—does little real constitutional
work. The first sentences of the Vesting Clauses (which set forth the adjectives
“legislative,” “judicial,” and “executive”) can be cut from the Constitution and
absolutely nothing happens: as I have demonstrated at length elsewhere, the
Supreme Court still sits, the Congress is elected, and the President presides over
the Executive Branch.239 As Madison predicted, it is the representational provi-

232. For some sophisticated theories, see Brown, supra note 229, at 1514–17, 1529–31 (arguing that
separation of powers disputes involve important questions of individual rights); Abner S. Greene,
Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 124 (1994)
(emphasizing the checks and balances between the President and Congress); Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1256 (1988) (arguing that
“the Constitution circumscribes the power of the branches by limiting the ways each can act”); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 228
(explaining a “minimal” conception of the separation of powers); Strauss, supra note 229, at 522
(“[C]ourts should view separation-of-powers cases in terms of the impact of challenged arrangements
on the balance of power among the three named heads of American government . . . .”); Paul R.
Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
301, 303–07 (1989) (emphasizing a rule-of-law approach that minimizes conflicts of interest).
233. See Nourse, Anatomy, supra note 228, at 751–54; Nourse, Vertical, supra note 228, at 839–41.
234. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. Nourse, supra note 7, at 474, 486, 495.
236. Nourse, Anatomy, supra note 228, at 900.
237. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, § 7, II, § 4.
238. U.S. CONST. arts. I, § 1, II, § 1, III, § 1.
239. See Nourse, Anatomy, supra note 228, at 839; see also Nourse, Vertical, supra note 228, at
761–68 (demonstrating how changes in vertical relationships can change horizontal structure).
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sions of the Constitution—the ones that create voting and electoral connections,
and through them, appointment powers—that drive the separation of powers, by
aligning the incentives of the “man” with the constitutional rights of the
“place.”240
Justice Cardozo was right when he suggested that grand structural principles
cannot be reduced to adjectives.241 Doing so encourages overbroad readings,
whether of legislative, executive, or judicial power.242 Adjectival formalism in
the executive sphere has led to admissions that unitary theories may lead to
aggrandizement of power by the Executive, premised on the idea that the
adjective takes on the meanings of those who seek to apply it, ignoring the
President’s role in the entire Constitution.243 Similar risks—infidelity to text,
emptiness, or aggrandizement—can appear in statutory interpretation. Interpreters who rely upon legalist as opposed to ordinary meaning risk expanding the
domain of statutes to accord with judicial rather than popular meanings.
Relying on the Bicameralism Clause alone risks legitimizing an empty list of
zeros and ones and—if applied across the board—would bar judges from
relying on judicial canons or common law and might even require them to
affirmatively embrace absurd results.244
Critics will claim I have been too quick to reject the formalists’ affection for
bicameralism. In cases like INS v. Chadha, for example, the Supreme Court has
explicitly relied upon the Bicameralism Clause to strike down the one-house
legislative veto.245 Chadha was correct to strike down the one-house veto. The
Court’s reliance on the Bicameralism Clause, however, raises serious questions,
for the same reason that relying on the single adjective “executive” raises
problems in defining the President’s role in the separation of powers. First,
overbreadth: the majority’s definition of “legislative power” was broad enough
to cover vast amounts of activity uncontroversially carried out by executive
agencies.246 Second, uncertainty: as critics of Chadha rightly note,247 even
members of the Supreme Court could not agree upon the proper function being
240. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 337 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton) (Cosimo 2006).
241. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936) (“[A] great principle of constitutional law
is not susceptible of comprehensive statement in an adjective.”) (Cardozo, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
242. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
243. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 84–88 (2009).
244. Manning, supra note 81, 2,391–92.
245. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
246. The emphasis here should be placed on executive agencies. There is nothing in this argument
that depends upon the controversy about independent agencies (a controversy I find overblown). As a
realistic matter, a President can fire the heads of independent agencies if he has a good reason. This has
proven little barrier to a unified executive department as an administrative matter; this is, however, a far
different claim than one that the President has unitary powers in all matters, such as war. See Victoria F.
Nourse & John P. Figura, Toward a Representational Theory of the Executive, 91 B.U. L. REV. 273,
294–302 (2011) (reviewing STEPHEN G. CALEBRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM
WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008)).
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performed, a necessary precondition to invoking the Bicameralism Clause (if, as
Justice Powell believed,248 the action was adjudication, bicameralism would be
irrelevant). Third, aggrandizement: if a court were in fact to assert bicameralism
as it was applied in Chadha, almost all agency action could violate the Constitution because rules made by agencies are not passed by the House or the Senate
nor approved by the President.
2. Purposivism as a Functionalist Theory of Separation of Powers
Unlike textualism, purposivism is far more comfortable with power-sharing
arrangements. The purposivists’ view of the legislature as acting reasonably is a
fiction based on the hope of judicial–legislative interaction. The role of the court
under the Hart and Sacks purposivist model is to act as a “relational agent.”249
That of course is a theory of power sharing between Congress and the courts,
albeit one that was never explained by Hart and Sacks themselves, much less
grounded in the Constitution. Professor William Eskridge, who has done far
more along these lines than most, is not terribly worried about courts “making
law” or the principle of “legislative supremacy.”250 And the reason he is not
worried about courts making law is that he is assuming a functional theory of
the separation of powers—that the Constitution enjoins the departments to share
power as well as to separate it.
It is certainly true that the Constitution provides for shared powers in some
cases, but this does not mean that the “shared-power theory” escapes the
failings of a “purist” functional approach. There are just as many problems with
an excessively zealous shared-power view of the separation of powers as with
an excessively zealous “unitary-power” view. Do we really want Congress to
share power with courts to decide individual cases? Do we really want courts
sharing the power to remove the Secretary of State? Shared-power theories need
cabining just as much as do separated-power theories. These risks are repeated
in the context of statutory interpretation theory. Shared-power theorists never
tell us how much power is to be shared, just as purposivists are quick to assume
a law’s purpose is their own. For this reason, purposivist theories of statutory
interpretation, like shared-power theories of the separation of powers, are often
criticized as expanding statutes on the one hand and aggrandizing judicial
power on the other hand.
3. Game Theory as Combining Formalist and Functionalist Theories of the
Separation of Powers
Game theory’s assumptions coincide with both formalist and functional

247. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 715–18
& n.181 (1997).
248. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 964 (Powell, J., concurring).
249. Eskridge, supra note 6, at 321.
250. Id. at 322.
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models. Like textualists, game theorists embrace a common law, legalistic idea
of statutory interpretation: laws are like contracts. To the extent that game
theorists emphasize that statutory interpretation should mirror contract law, they
imagine the interbranch encounter as governed by judicial values alone. On the
other hand, to the extent that game theory reconstructs legislative bargains, it
aims toward a greater partnership role, suggesting the relational agent of the
purposivist. In this sense, game theory assumes the risks of both formalism and
functionalism. These risks may in fact balance each other in positive ways. As I
will argue shortly, I believe game theory may reduce the risks of purposivism
and textualism, as long as game theorists give up the assumption that statutes
are always finely wrought compromises and remember that legislative deals are
shaped by Congress’s rules.
B. A REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

Elsewhere, I have argued that separation of powers disputes have little to do
with fights over adjectives like “executive” or “judicial” (or at least these fights
are unresolvable at the margins).251 The question is not whether we properly
assign a functional label: even the Supreme Court finds this extremely difficult
to do.252 The question is how shifting power affects power-defined-asrepresentation. The representational approach “asks whether and how the shifting of tasks among government players affects ‘who’ will decide,”253 where the
“who” is the people, represented by state, district, and nation. Power is thus
defined as the power of the people organized in “constituencies creating the
departments.”254 In such a world, “the risks are not descriptive impurities, but
structural incentives likely to change political relationships between the governed and their governors.”255
A simple historical example shows how this approach is consistent with both
the text and originalism.256 Imagine a constitution that included the Vesting
Clauses precisely as they are today, with their various functional descriptions.
Imagine that Congress’s powers were limited as they are today to those enumerated (such as the commerce power), and imagine that the President’s and
the Supreme Court’s affirmative powers are also the same. Now, imagine the
following changes: the House of Representatives elects the members of
the Senate; the President has no veto; and Congress appoints members of the
Executive Branch. Such proposals were considered but rejected in 1787.257

251. See Nourse, Anatomy, supra note 228; Nourse, Vertical, supra note 228. I am not the only
scholar to eschew this exercise. See Merrill, supra note 232.
252. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727, 746 (1986); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
253. Nourse, Vertical, supra note 228, at 759.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Nourse, Anatomy, supra note 228; Nourse, Vertical, supra note 228.
257. The Virginia Plan, which in amended form became our Constitution, originally provided
that “members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by those of the
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Under this constitution, the Congress is still legislating, the President is still
executing (indeed, we have purified the President’s power by eliminating the
Article I veto “legislative” power), and the courts are deciding cases and
controversies. No functional changes have occurred. But the separation of
powers will disappear.
Under this constitution, the House will be more powerful than the Senate—
those elected by the House will bow to the House’s will. The Congress will be
more powerful than the President because he will have no veto threat. And,
most importantly, the Congress will take over the Executive Branch, creating
the functional equivalent of a one-department government. This will not occur
because functions have been mixed, but because political relationships have
changed. Real power in our government depends upon control and political
relationships, not functional labels, and the Framers knew this quite well. The
Constitutional Convention specifically rejected this kind of constitution because
it was similar to that of many states in which power led to a “[l]egislative
vortex,” as Madison put it.258
Stressing representation and relation violates no text. Representation sits at
the core of Articles I and II. The Constitution’s text shows us that “the departments are created by various political relationships—by voting, by representation, by appointment.”259 This should be more obvious: if you allow the
House to elect the Senate, the House will control the Senate, which means that
some constituencies will be strengthened relative to others. Localities will be
more powerful than states. The functions of the House and Senate do not
change—both are legislating—but their relationship does, and with that change
in relationship comes a shift in powers of representation. To use a more familiar
example: the problem in shifting to the Supreme Court the power to go to war is
not that the Court is exercising an improper function, but that an unelected
court, not the people, will decide.260
C. APPLYING A REPRESENTATIONAL SEPARATION OF POWERS THEORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CASES

Under traditional views, the separation of powers requires a theory of “judicial” power, “legislative” power, and “executive” power. If I am correct that
functional essentialism raises risks, then how does one apply representational
analysis, particularly in statutory interpretation? Representational theory looks
first.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)
(recording the May 29, 1787 resolutions proposed by Edmund Randolph of Virginia). The New Jersey
Plan, a competing proposal supported by a minority of States, provided the President with no veto
power. See id. at 242–45. The Virginia Plan proposed that the Executive (which was thought by many
to be made up of multiple persons) be appointed by the Congress. See id. at 21 (“Resd. that a National
Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of years . . . .”).
258. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 257, at 35 (statement of James
Madison of Virginia, July 17, 1787).
259. Nourse, Vertical, supra note 228, at 758.
260. Id.
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to risks to the people, to the constituencies driving the internal separation of
powers. For example, if you shift power from Congress to courts, you shift
power from a state and local constituency to no constituency; if you shift power
from Congress to an agency, you shift power from a state and local constituency
to a national constituency.
Let us assume that we are worried about shifting lawmaking power to the
Judiciary when courts are asked to fill gaps in statutory interpretation. That
means we are worried about a shift from a political department (the Congress)
to a nonpolitical department (the federal courts), from a department that has a
strong electoral connection to one with no overt electoral connection. Let us call
this the “judicial aggrandizement risk”—that courts will simply decide using
their own judicial views without regard to the people.261 Second, shifting power
from the Congress to the courts shifts power from a body representing states
and localities (Congress) to one that is, if anything, a nationally oriented
institution (the federal courts). Let us call this the “federalism risk.” Finally,
shifting power from a supermajoritarian body to a body with no representation
imposes a risk that a court will impose the meanings of statutory losers rather
than winners. Call this the “super-countermajoritarian risk.” Although I have
stated these as risks, there is nothing fortuitous about them—these risks mirror
the foundation built in Part I, a foundation grounded in the Constitution’s
provisions for representation and bicameralism.262
Return to Holy Trinity to apply a representational analysis.263 The first risk is
that the Supreme Court will apply its own preferred meaning rather than
Congress’s meaning—a risk that the Court will not be a faithful agent. Enter our
earlier distinction between legalist and ordinary meaning. A court applying
legalist meaning without even considering ordinary meaning would, in my
opinion, risk violating the separation of powers. Legalist meaning raises the risk
of judicial aggrandizement of power by preferring the courts’ meaning (canons,
common law) to the people’s meaning (representatives’ meaning). After all, not
even academic textualists dispute the proposition that the legislature is the
superior of the Court and, that the Court, under principles of legislative supremacy, must defer to its power. If this is right, then academic theorists must
stop assuming that elite judicial meanings should apply and start considering
that popular, prototypical meaning should be a starting presumption, and that
this is not a matter of semantics but of constitutional restraint. This is not a

261. Cases like Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727, 746 (1986), or Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988), exemplify this risk because they put substantial power in the hands of persons who have no
electoral constituency.
262. As John Manning has written, even without the filibuster, bicameralism and presentment
impose “an effective supermajority requirement for legislation,” which gives “political minorities . . .
extraordinary power to block legislation or . . . to insist upon compromise.” John F. Manning, The
Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1701, 1717
(2004).
263. Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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theoretical point; it has consequences: an insistence on ordinary meaning in
Holy Trinity would, in my opinion, support the Supreme Court’s decision, based
on the prototypical meanings of the day.
Judicial aggrandizement is not the only constitutional risk arising from gap
filling in statutory interpretation. Federalism is also a risk. Every time a federal
court interprets a statute, it risks imposing a nationally appointed body’s view
on an institution directly connected to state and local entities (the Congress).
The statute in Holy Trinity pitted large interstate enterprises, such as railroads
(which wanted to import labor in mass quantities), against small manufacturers
and laboring men, groups far more likely to have local, state-based ties. Courts
should be more wary of the potential for this pro-nationalist bias. Federalism
supports the claims of those who argue that courts should defer to legislative
meaning, including legislative history. This may help to explain why it is that
deference to agency decisions has resulted in what should be decried by
federalists as a pro-nationalist bias: as Bill Eskridge has shown, and this theory
predicts, Chevron deference to agencies increases the degree to which national
law will preempt state law.264
Finally, there is the risk of super-countermajoritarianism—that a court will
impose the meaning not of the majority, but of a small minority, even while it
cloaks that meaning in the garb of “legislative intent.” This is particularly acute
when courts attempt to reconstruct deals or pick and choose from the legislative
record “loser’s” history (rather than using legislative history as a lexicon—as a
source of ordinary or legalist usage).265 To apply legalist meaning in Holy
Trinity (all laborers) risks countermajoritarianism. Why should the arguments of
the railroad financiers opposing the bill count as the meaning of the legislation?
Or why should we assume that Senator Tower’s understanding of his amendment merits deference when he voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act?266 This
differs from a simple risk of legalism because it disguises as a majority view
that of a superminority. Surely, courts in statutory interpretation cases, if they
are to be faithful agents, are to be faithful agents of the majority, not a tiny but
committed set of opponents to the bill!267
264. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 31, at 1443–44.
265. As we have seen above, it may be important to look at losers’ amendments or statements to
gain a proper context, but positive political theorists are correct in their warning that it would be
improper for a court, particularly given the supermajoritarian difficulty, to find the meaning of a law in
the statements of those who opposed it. See supra section II.C.2.
266. This is certainly true in cases like the Tower Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(which we know was filibustered). To adopt the minority view in the Tower case poses the risk of
importing the filibuster rule into the statutory interpretation enterprise. See supra section II.C.2
(discussing game theory and Tower).
267. Professor Manning seems to suggest that supermajoritarianism and bicameralism argue for
precisely the opposite result. See Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 7, at 1315 (“If the constitutionally or legislatively prescribed rules of procedure give minorities and preference outliers a
disproportionate voice in the legislative process, the judge’s job is to give effect to those procedures by
enforcing a clear but awkwardly written text.”). Under Manning’s view, features like bicameralism and
supermajoritarianism force compromise, and courts should not undermine that incentive. John F.

1174

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 99:1119

One might argue that I have stressed issues of judicial deference without
emphasizing ways in which the judiciary should in fact check legislative
excesses. Indeed, one way of thinking of academic textualism is that, to the
extent that it aims to discipline the legislature into writing clearer statutes, it
asks the judiciary to check the legislature. As I have indicated above, as a
descriptive matter, I think this “disciplining” idea verges on the fanciful: as
Adrian Vermeule has shown, courts do not have the institutional capacity to
discipline themselves to send a consistent enough message to Congress to
change its behavior.268 More importantly, there are no votes in semantic precision, and thus no incentive for the representative to listen to the routine signals
of courts, even if the occasional highly salient case may receive legislative
attention.
The disciplining argument also lacks normative legitimacy. Checking theory
cannot describe the separation of powers. If it did, judicial review would be the
norm, not the exception. Congress would be capable of adding checks willynilly, such as approving the removal of inferior or superior officers (a sure way
for the Congress to inject itself into the executive branch). Because judicial
review is the exception, not the norm, disciplining Congress—the analog of
judicial review within statutory interpretation—cannot be a legitimate primary
role for courts in statutory interpretation cases, if for no other reason than that
checks run riot would permit automatic judicial review of all exercises of
legislative power, a position contrary to a great tradition of judicial restraint in
constitutional law.
D. EVALUATING THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN LIGHT OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS RISKS

We may now assess the three theories of statutory interpretation we have
seen in Part II—textualism, purposivism, and game theory—from a separation
of powers perspective. It turns out that the rule that almost all academic purists
reject, but which prevails in most federal courts, is the one most likely to reduce
constitutional risks. Put in other words, none of the pure academic theories can
Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648,
1650–51 (2001). There is no question that supermajoritarianism forces compromise and that this may
be legislatively virtuous. The question remains whether courts should defer to minorities, as opposed to
majorities. There are three problems with Professor Manning’s view-from-structure: (1) courts do not
create the incentive to compromise; it is demanded by the Constitution ex ante; (2) given the strength of
the internal incentive, no external force like a court ruling or rule of statutory interpretation is likely to
change it (senators do not sit around reading slip sheets; horizontal communication between the
departments is weak and full of noise except in the most politically salient cases); (3) courts that seek to
perfect this vision of structure in statutory interpretation risk reconstructing the position of a legislator
who opposed the statute. Surely the Constitution does not require that courts interpret statutes against
the majority will or exacerbate the already supermajoritarian character of the Congress. Game theory
certainly does not support this, nor in my opinion does the Constitution. The only way to tell whether
there was in fact a deal that can be reconstructed is to look at legislative history and then to remember
that, as textualists rightly claim, it is unlikely to resolve the interpretive issue before the Court.
268. See VERMEULE, supra note 8.
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lay claim to reducing these risks as satisfactorily as the judicially wellestablished but academically oxymoronic position linking ordinary meaning
textualism with legislative history.
Of all the theories we have seen, it is ordinary meaning textualism that fares
the best—if, and this is a significant if—it declines to blind itself to legislative
history. Ordinary meaning textualism should, in theory, be the most open to
public meaning and thus most deferential to the legislature. Who is better at
determining ordinary meaning: legislators bound by an electoral connection or
judges with no such connection? Looking at legislative history to determine
whether usage is legalist or prototypical provides the best chance to reduce the
possibility of a judge supplanting his or her legalist meaning for that of
Congress and the people. And, for that reason, relative to its competitors
(emphasis on the “relative”), it provides the best means of reducing both
superminoritarian readings and federalism risks by properly deferring to a body
with interests far more closely aligned to states and localities.
If one cares about judicial activism and the separation of powers, one must
care about judges deferring to the legislature. The reason we have a separation
of powers is that no man, no judge, no president, no legislator may be a “judge
in his own cause.”269 As Professors Farnsworth, Guzior, and Mulani have
shown, once interpreters are asked to take an external view, one which considers ordinary meaning (as opposed to legalist meaning), they are more likely to
check their ideological biases at the door.270 This does not mean that judges or
scholars must rummage through the legislative history. The congressional record is not an appellate opinion. Reviewing the legislative record under this
view would be an attempt to look for evidence of ordinary meaning. In Holy
Trinity, reviewing the entire legislative record (not slicing and dicing it up into
one-shot exchanges) offers clear and convincing evidence that manual labor
was by far the most common meaning used to debate the statute.271 This
meaning cannot be used to trump the text, but here it supports the prototypical
ordinary meaning of dictionaries of the day, not to mention the Supreme Court’s
actual result, without invoking either vague legislative spirits or claims of
absurdity.
Ordinary meaning is, of course, only a starting point. As humans, legislators
use language in both prototypical and legalist senses. In cases involving courts’
own procedures, the risk of legalism may be minimal. Indeed, in such cases,
one might even assume that Congress has delegated to courts the authority to
interpret the law consistent with courts’ own precedents. Examples here are
evidentiary rules such as those in Bock Laundry272 or the standard for scienter
in securities actions. In fact, legalist meaning may be quite appropriate if it is

269.
270.
271.
272.

Nourse, supra note 7, at 470–71.
Farnsworth et al., supra note 129.
See supra section II.B.
See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 505 (1989).
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clear that Congress has used prototypical meaning to oppress. For example, a
court asked to interpret race in the context of the nineteenth-century racial terms
in the legislative debate on the Holy Trinity statute might conclude that such a
popular meaning runs contrary to present-day constitutional norms and, to avoid
a constitutional question, a legalist meaning of race should prevail.
Game theory has important insights for those who adopt a version of this
approach known as “imaginative reconstruction.” Game theorists are right that
loser’s history cannot be the meaning of the statute. Imaginative reconstruction,
however, cannot adopt game theory wholesale without significant modifications.
First, it must, as its most sophisticated proponents acknowledge, include audience costs (the vertical bargain), or it will construct an imaginary contract.
More importantly, it cannot assume that there is a deal when there is not. If it
does, game theory risks aggravating the difficulty it identifies (relying on losers’
history, or constructing history out of thin air). Second, assuming, for example,
that any particular word in a statute is the result of a deal ignores the best
evidence (if any) of a deal—the legislative history, including changes in textual
language. Even assuming that the legislative record is unclear or repeats the
ambiguity of the statute, consulting it first (at a minimum as a lexicon)273
provides better information and greater checking power for judicial activism
than blinding oneself to it.
To the extent that purposivism is willing to look to legislative history, it, like
imaginative reconstruction, reduces some separation of powers risks but, in the
end, may do no better than other theories at minimizing judicial activism and
deferring to majoritarian will. Game theory at least has a concept of the
difference between winners and losers, between deferring to a congressional
majority as opposed to a minority. Purposivism aims to defer, but does not have
the understanding or sophistication of imaginative reconstruction, much less
game theory. Like academic textualists who occasionally try their hand at
legislative history, purposivists slice and dice the legislative record as if it were
a judicial opinion, which it most definitely is not. In this sense, academics’
versions of purposivism can yield just as serious countermajoritarian risks as
academic textualism: if losers’ history is seen as having the same weight as the
record as a whole, purposivism can be as countermajoritarian as a narrow,
legalist textualism. To the extent that purposivism relies on losers’ purposes, it
raises the potential to increase federalism risks and to impose judicially activist
meanings.
Of all the theories, however, legalist, academic textualism poses the most
serious separation of powers risks. Literalist, legalist meanings, as Judge Posner
has wisely insisted, can be as broad as handing over a sledgehammer for a sleep
aid. Academic textualism (imposing boundary, peripheral meanings) raises the
greatest risk relative to other approaches because it refuses to check the
273. This is a minimalist use of history and is theoretically different from other uses, a topic I do not
address in this Article. See supra note 10.
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Judiciary’s most likely biases toward legalist meaning. It refuses to look outside
a judicial world to defer to its constitutional superior, the legislature, for which
it exudes a considerable amount of “eat your spinach” contempt. This aggravates federalism risks by potentially supplanting state and local meaning with
nationalist meanings and antimajoritarian risks by potentially deferring to superminorities, not majorities. Only if academic textualists were to use legislative
history to check the risks of judicial activism, before imposing judicially created
meanings from canons or common law, would they properly respect the separation of powers. Of course, this would mean, to these academics, that they were
no longer textualists, a purist proposition with which the Judiciary, including the
Supreme Court, has respectfully disagreed.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have tried to show how theories of statutory interpretation
not only imply a theory of Congress but as well a theory of the separation of
powers. Critiquing three leading theories—textualism, purposivism, and game
theory—as inconsistent with dominant, evidence-based, institutional features of
Congress, I argue that each of these theories may increase risks of judicial
aggrandizement and judicial legislation. Whether my analysis is correct or not,
it should now be clear that theories of statutory interpretation must move
beyond internecine warfare. They must articulate a coherent theory of Congress
and, more importantly, ground themselves in a theory of the separation of
powers of the Constitution entire.

